'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎85r] (21/30)

19
Fuad, commanding' the Vlllth Army Corps, when he heard of the British advance, decided to withdraw
) troops* northwards from Kerak, though he was anxious regarding the safety of Kutraui, which he
regarded as the key or the Kerak supply area.
.Amman was aitacked on the 27th, on which date railway communication was cut. Jema! XL
Cpramsnder of the 4th Army, who had no^r arrived at Amman and taken over the direction of operatiou'g
from All Kiza Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. (appointed Commander East Jordan Group as lately as the 2Srd March), was very
anxious about the situation.! lie issued orders for certain^ troops, whjch had arrived at Kalaaf pz Zerk i
from the north, to take up the position behind the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. el Hamman and reconnoitre the British, who were
west and south of Zerka. He decided to withdraw the Amman Group and to hold the line of the
adi Zierka, for which purpose he considered at least two strong infantry and two cavalry divisions were
necessary.S
On the 29th, the enemy had ascertained from prisoners that the whole Anzac Mounted Division had
crossed the Jordan, and that there were in front of Amman at least two British cavalry brigades and
probabiy one infantry brigade of the (iOth I'ivision. as well as camelry farther to the south. Althongn
Jemal II. reported that violent attacks by the whole Anzac Division, and at least one brigade of the
HOth Division, had been repulsed with great loss during the last two days, he was sensible of artillery
inferiority, and was certain that British reinforcements were arriving from the rear and that their attacks
would be redoubled. He realized the importance of Amman both as regards the tribal situation as far north
as Deraa, and as regards the safety of Damascus itself. He still considered an immediate conoen(ration at
Zerka was ncccssarv to save " a terrible disaster."
Jemal's report appears to have created an impression in Constantinople, for on tire 30th, Enver. who
had on the 27th March expressed his anticipation that the end would be attained shortly on the other frvntt,
and that then the irreatest assistance would be given to the Hejaz front, now informed Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at
Medina that the situation at Amman had become critical. He advised him to withdraw, if necessary,
the largest possible number of men from his district into Medina, while those who could not reach Medina
luiist resist to t he last man. Iiaihvay material should also be brought into Medina.
On the 31 st March, l 1 uad reponed that the British had commenced to retire in a westerly direction
on the night of March and that the Turkish pursuit from Amman would comuieoce on the morning
of the 31st. Concentration of rroopa from the south of Jize was to continue as rapidly as possible. The
latter order was endorsed by Enver at Constantinople, who considered that all troops th;it could possibly be
spared from the Hejaz Expeditionary Force should be sent northwards, since, if the Turkish troops at
Amman were reinforced as soon as possible, the defeat of the British troops there was very probable.
On the 1st April, Jemal II. reported that 300 British dead had so far been buried at Amman and a few others
still remained to be buned. The Circassiuns reported that the British had withdrawn in disorder towards
Salt and towards Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sir,}] while a convoy of wounded had mo \ed from Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sir to Salihie. Natives
had taken a successful part in an advance guard action near Sir, in which 8 Circassians were killed and
30 wounded, while at Kerak about GOO loyal Bedouins had promised to serve with the Turks. On the
3 (tth March, on hearing <if the British repulse, Fakhri congratulnted Fuad at Amman —I have kissed the
threshold of the Prophet's Tomb, and am praying on behalf of you and your gallant troops. 1 kiss
your eyes."
T'ie subsequent operations in the Es Salt area at the beginning of May gave further proof of the
Turkish determination to pre^ent the British actually joining hands with the Arabs and establishing an
uuiied front from the Mediterranean to the liejaz railway.
APPENDIX K.
KOWEIT BLOCKADE.
Owing to reports having been received that large quantities of supplies were reaching the enemy
from Koweit, the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, in consultatiun with Sir Percy Cox, proposed m
October, 1917. that this port should be blockaded.
In December, 1917. the Viceroy poin<ed out that the institution of a blockade might alienate the SheikhT
and simplv divert illicit dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. traffic, and considered it preferable to offer inducements to the sheikh to take
adequate measures himself. This course was eventually adopted, and early in 1918 the Sheikh undertook to
control the inlrmd caravan traffic. Owing to the strong pressure put upon him by Koweit merchants
considerable difficulty was experienced in getting the Sheikh to consent to our superintending his blockade,
but after some straight talking he accepted our proposals, and from that moment met all suggestions of our
blockade officer without demur. In consequence of his friendly attitude it w|8 decide i thai the Sheikh
should be given the C.3.I., and that we should forego the repayment of one lakh One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees and 87,0U0 rufteea
advanced to his father for the installation of a water plant.
In Ap;il. Kgypt reported that about 5,000 camels had arrived at Damascus with <roods from Koweit. and
at the beginning of May, Baghdad reported that it was impossible to enforce a strict blockade locally
(although two of His Majesty's ships had been sent), and considered that it should either be enforced by
the Government or allowed to fall in a; eyance.
• 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3/152nd Regiment. 1/I48th? ^I4<ith) uegiment. Camel Columns and Veterinary
Hp., Q.F. Field Artillery Bn. and Wire'ess Station.
t Railway communication with Amman was cut off completely, from the south on the 2.7th and from the
north on the 28th March. The Turkish force in Amman, consisting of i,tW> ritles. was heavily
outnumbered by the British attacking troops, who were able to be reinforced. Turkish artillerv was
inferior to the British and ammunition was short. There was only a few days supply of food. It was
impossible to retire by night to Zerka. as the line was swarming with Bedouin.
* 1 German infantry Company, 1 Engineer Deiachment, Circassian Volunteer Squadron,.J/-3rd Ivegiuit-ui,
1 li'lst Regiment {en route from Damascus), 12 officers and 900 men (ready to leave Damascus).
§ 3rd Cavalry Division, Independent (2nd Caucasus) Cavalry Brigade, lath Division./)/« I'.Hst Regiment,
another Infantry Division.
|| A Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. in the Balqa, south of Es Salt, which enters the Jordan as the W adi Nimrin.
II The present Sheikh of Koweit, Salem Ibn Mubarak, succeeded Sultan Jabir,
February, 1917.
I If
his
brother.
id
(6144-19)
C 2
-;,v.