'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎77r] (5/30)

north oi" Tebuk, which had previously been unmolested, was now attacked not only as
f: as Maan, but even north of the latter place. Despite the British set-back at Gaza
in March, 1917, Maan itself was threatened by the Arab forces, as w^s also the forests
district ol Hishe to the north-west, whence the Turks were drawing-Hheir fuel supply
tor the railway.* The effect on Medina was soon evident, and had the Turks been able
to evacuate the whole or part of the garrison and the force Immediatelv to its
north by means of the railway it is probable that they would have done so. A
programme was drawn up in November, 1917, in anticipation of the fall of Jerusalem
for the evacuation of part of the Medina garrison, after which the Tebuk force was to
be evacuated.
1 he British victory at Bir Saba and Gaza occurred in September, 1917, and with
the development of the British threat on Jerusalem, the situation of the Turkish forces
on the railway was recognized by their leaders to be serious. The staff officer
left in charge at Maau during the temporary absence of Jemal Ill.t reported
to him on the 7th November his view on the situation. He appositely compared
the attitude of ths Arabs to a gangrene which had begun in the finger (Medina),
which, if not cut off would spread to the hand (Maan) and finally to the arm
(Syria). Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Medina replied to Jemal I. on the 12th November ,
regarding the proposed evacuation of Medina, that the movement might prove the
dawn of the " Fourth Age." No autiioritative explanation of the expression is forth
coming, but it is believed that according to Mahommedan tradition when the '' Third
Age comes to an end the Turkish Empire will cease to hold the predominant position
in fslatn.
♦ V?
The evacuation of Medina was to be completed within 75 days, but the Turks were,
and have remained, unable to carry it out owing to lack of rolling stock, want of fuel,
the impossibility of accumulating sufficient supplies, and constant interruptions of the
railway.
7. By the end of 1917 Felsal had secured the adhesion or neutrality of all the
Arabs as far up as Maan and had come to an agreement with others in the north,! and
could thus contemplate an advance further north into the Trans-Jordan country. He
had collected mere partly trained troops and Bedouins. He w r as also much better
equipped with guns, sm ill arms und auxiliary services than hitherto. The Turks in
Maan and in the Hishe Forest area made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra
region in October and November, 1917, but they were too weak to press home any
advantage they gained. On the other hand, the cold experienced in this mountainous
region militated against a strong offensive by the Arabs,
8. The situation therefore at the end of 1917 was, briefly, as follows ; —
The Turks had been completely driven from the Hejaz except from the actual
railway ; the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Medina, now reduced to some 11,000 rations,
was reduced in efficiency and suffering considerable privation and sickness; the
Composite Porce at Tebuk, reduced to some 1,500 rations was in a similar state, and
traffic between these places was being constantly interrupted owing to the efiorts of
Sherif All in the area south-west of Medina, and Abdulla in the area between Medina
and El Ula. Further north Sherif Feisal was operating against the railway in the
Maan area and had seriously interfered with the fuel supply in the liishe forest. I he
Turks found it necessary to establish a post at Tadmur to prevent the^ Arab movement
spreading to the Euphrates, and to establish line of communication posts on the
bTermuk Valley and Deraa—Maan railways.
During the period under review the Arabs had engaged the Turks on some 54
occasions, inflicting casualties§ (according to Arab reports) amounting to 3,400 killed,
757 wounded, while the captures amounted to 6,7G6 prisoners, 44 guns, 11 machine
guns and 2,417 rifles, [j
Arab reports also recorded 42 attacks on the railway, during which 7 engines.
3 wagons, 7,770 rails, 34 bridges and 16 culverts had been destroyed.^
* A light railway ran from Aneiza (second station north of Maan) into the lliahe iorest, 'ittd was ustid
to transport wood fuel for the use of the engines on the Uejaz Railway. ihis line was pulled up at thf
beginning of 1918.
t See Appendix D. * See Appendix L. § Appendix >s '
11 This information cannot he taken as strictly reliable, but Sir R. W ingate reported that m 1 ( J16.
3.345 prisoners were sent to Egypt and l,3o4 in 1917 {see Appendix D).
In December the train containing SultymSn Ibn Rifada. paramount chief of the Billi tribe and hostile
to King llussein, was destroyed. Five Turkish officers, Suleiman Ibn Rifada and several of his staff \\ ere killeu.
Tde Arabs succeeded in capturing from this train £T24,0C , 0 in gold and five horses and destroyed a
considerable amount of foodstuffs.
(0144,-19)
A 2