'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎76v] (4/30)

* In addition to this force at Medina, known as the Hejaz Expeditionary iorce, a
Comp<ieite Force under Jemal III* of which the strength « January, 1U!. • s
so.ue 5.000 rations, was establish^ with headquarters at Tebuk, and another loreet
( -oneist'iu' in June. 1917, of four battalions) had its headquarters at Maan. To these
forces were Slpporti^ed tbied sections of the line, each having small garrisons posted at
the various stations in its area.
4 The Arab forces, though numerically strong, lacked guns and supplies. They
were deficient in small arms, equipment and organization, client JheisaI, who at the
outbreak of the revolt commanded the Sheritial iorces in the .Ltxlina area, i;u uit.T
camos of some 10,000 men each, but no single camp had as many as 2,000 rifles ;
contingents of men joined or feft at will, and his troops were quite inexperienced m the
art of modern warfare. Steps were taken to organize, arm and equip the Arabs, and
towards the end of 1916 they were formed into three independent groups, one under
Sherif Ali, about 8,000 strong, facing Medina on the south, another under Shenf
Abdulla, numbering some 4,000 men, encirclinij Medina on the east and north-east,^whii*'
Sherif Feisal, with some 8,000 to 9,000 men, the pick of the force, was based on Yamb^
and operated against the railway. Such supreme command as was exercised appears to
have been vested in Sherii Hussein personally with Aziz l>o\ <4 Masn as uuaslt i
of War.
5. By this time it had become clear that little was to be hoped from an Arab siege
of Medina, and even less from any assaults the Arabs might be induced to make on its
works. The operations which suggested themselves as likely to produce the most
fruitful results were systematic raids on the Hejaz railway, which, from Medina to
Damascus, consists of some 800 miles of single track. But, to enable these to be carried out
and also to extend the revolt to the north towards Syria, it was necessary to have more
northerly bases. With this object in view Sherif Feisal with his northern army installed
himself at Wejh, already occupied by landing parties, in Januarys 1917, and proceeded
to extend his hold further to the north towards Dhaba and Moweilah on the Red Sea
coast. His brother Sherif Abdulla had meanwhile moved with his force to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. A is,
north-west of Medina; while his other brother, Sherif Ali, remained in his old place
south and south-west of that town. The raiding carried out during the following six];
months, with British and French assistance, lowered the strength and spirit of the
Turkish forces at Medina, and attracted many fresh Arab elements, but it did not
isolate that town. The railway line proved harder to wreck permanently, and the
enemy better prepared to effect repairs, than had been expected. Demolition work
without hope of loot and any dogged occupation of points on the broken track did not
appeal to the Bedouins, and it was not till the autumn of 1917 that a different policy,
that of mining trains, with the attraction of consequent plunder, was acted upon. This
immediately produced more satisfactory results, but the Arabs could not be induced to
complete the destruction oi a train or of the permanent way before starting to search
for plunder.
6. Meanwhile, Akaba had been captured on the 6th July by a Sherifial force,
accompanied by Lawrence,§ and Sherif Feisal moved there in July, 1917, thus enabling
operations and propaganda to be extended much farther to the north. The railway
• See Appendix D. t See A p pendix ( ,
.v + fell on the 11th March. This event does not seem to have reacted on the Hejaz situation to
- L ' / l ^ ei1 possibly owing to the lack of cohesion which was still apparent
m August, 1918, between different factions in Arabia.
• + § ' <4 tvn Law rente left ^ ejh on the 9th May, 1917, with a few men and Sherif Naair, with the
bLTfor the Arab^orces 16 ^ Nurthern ^ejaz tribes, and, if possible, to open Akaba for use as a supply
O-f ^. ur i Staalan, but on hearing he was north Lawrence proceeded to Nebk, near
Md*Howeitat the P?™** SheSf Nasir remained in Qaf to enrol Rualla, Sherarat
Ba'tlix^k where he blew\ ^ w ^' e Lawrence proceeded north to near Tadmur and thence west to
^Salk^'a^n the^)ru^ /'f Wa ' ,r *-| ,r and t ^ ence sout ^ to within o miles of Damascus; thence
\bout the end of June law aIK om t ^ re . 1,0 Azrak, where he saw Nuri Shaalan and his son, Nawwai.
tKm ¥ on ^ 30th they moved to El defer, east of Maan,
Maan-Ak»baroad\ where the eendamp\» 8 fhld^^ r o v r? A 5Cak '' The y th 7 101 ) ^ WBilah on lh ".
bv the 4/l78th lieg-iment from tv , ? (iestro y e d by an advance column, but had been reoccupied
t^e 2nd July takin^r?80ii^er^beToffi ^ the P ractical ^^ihilation of this battalion at Aba Lissan on
me V ith a -r-^rT 'n.ey .be,,captured the
of 3 officers and 140 men, thence to El Kb \rl !i 5? l n f rched 0,1 ^^thira, wiping on
6th July, 1917, with 600 prisoners, about vo' ,tTV i 0 n The pa . rty euterecl Akaba
some 700 Turks. ' 'cers and a iierman non-commissioned officer, having killed
worth to any enterprising Arab the auml/T'L^ ouu* U>r the faCt 11151 durin S the wllole time his head vrus