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'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [21r] (46/424)
The record is made up of 1 volume (208 folios). It was created in 1925. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
25
Immediately after the Shaiba operations, General Nixon began to
^withdraw the troops to Basra, preparatory to a possible move towards
Ahwaz.
On the 19th April, the Secretary of State wired to the Viceroy that
the Admiralty were becoming anxious about the oil situation, and that
an immediate movement on the Karun side would be welcomed by the
Home Governfrient: politically it was considered very desirable to
expel the Turks from Persian Arabistan.
At this date, the Secretary of State did not know of General Nixon's
new instructions, which made the safety of the oil wells a subsidiary
object, the main object being the control of the Basra vilayet.
The Indian Government did not wish to tie General Nixon down
in any way : the Secretary of State's telegram was, therefore, forwarded
to General Nixon with the intimation that he was to use his own dis
cretion.
On the 19th April, General Nixon asked for another cavalry brigade,
stating that the cavalry brigade now with the force could not meet
the demands shortly to be made on that arm. A Pioneer battalion
was also asked for.
The request was refused : a
coolie
A term used to describe labourers from a number of Asian countries, now considered derogatory.
corps or Indus boatmen were
offered instead of the pioneers.
The Secretary of State was also informed of General Nixon's request.
This drew the reply that the refusal was concurred in : and that the
demand indicated an important offensive movement. No advance
beyond the present theatre of operations would be sanctioned. An
advance to Amara with the object of controlling the tribes between
that place and the Karun, and thus adding to the safety of the pipe
line, might be supported.
" Our present position is strategically a aound one, and we
cannot, at present, afford to take risks by extending it unduly. In
Mesopotamia a safe game must be played."
It is obvious, then, that in the minds of the Home Government, the
original object of the expedition—the safety of the oil—was still para
mount.
Looked at from a broad point of view, it can hardly be doubted that
the attitude of the Secretary of State was absolutely sound.
The day after the telegram was despatched, we were to make our
first landing in Gallipoli. That would be our main theatre against
the Turks. There was also the Suez Canal theatre, which was probably
more important than the Mesopotamian one : for the Sue74 Canal was
a vital artery of our imperial communications. The Mesopotamian
theatre was third in order of importance : moreover we had already
attained our object in sending the expedition. Unfortunately we
were encouraged by success after success steadily to increase our hold
c 2
About this item
- Content
The volume is Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917. Compiled by officers of the Staff College, Quetta, October-November 1923. Part I - Report (Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1925). The volume is published by the General Staff Army Headquarters, India.
The volume is divided into twenty-five chapters, which cover the whole campaign in detail from December 1914 to April 1917, including the origins of the campaign; the British advance on Baghdad-Ctesiphon; operations at Kut [Al-Kūt]; the capture of Baghdad; and general reflections on the campaign.
The volume includes nineteen photographic illustrations.
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (208 folios)
- Arrangement
There is a table of contents on folio 4. The volume also contains a list of illustrations (f 6) and list of maps and sketches that appear in Part II [IOR/L/MIL/17/15/72/2] (f 5). There is an index to the volume between ff 205-208.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at 1 on the front cover and terminates at 210 on the inside back cover. The numbers are written in pencil, are enclosed in a circle, and appear in the top right hand corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. page of each folio. This is the sequence used to determine the order of pages.
Pagination: there is also an original printed pagination sequence numbered 2-361 (ff 8-208).
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- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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Copyright: How to use this content
- Reference
- IOR/L/MIL/17/15/72/1
- Title
- 'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, 2r:209v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence