"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎٢‎١] (٤٢٤/٤٦)

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Immediately after the Shaiba operations, General Nixon began to
^withdraw the troops to Basra, preparatory to a possible move towards
Ahwaz.
On the 19th April, the Secretary of State wired to the Viceroy that
the Admiralty were becoming anxious about the oil situation, and that
an immediate movement on the Karun side would be welcomed by the
Home Governfrient: politically it was considered very desirable to
expel the Turks from Persian Arabistan.
At this date, the Secretary of State did not know of General Nixon's
new instructions, which made the safety of the oil wells a subsidiary
object, the main object being the control of the Basra vilayet.
The Indian Government did not wish to tie General Nixon down
in any way : the Secretary of State's telegram was, therefore, forwarded
to General Nixon with the intimation that he was to use his own dis
cretion.
On the 19th April, General Nixon asked for another cavalry brigade,
stating that the cavalry brigade now with the force could not meet
the demands shortly to be made on that arm. A Pioneer battalion
was also asked for.
The request was refused : a coolie corps or Indus boatmen were
offered instead of the pioneers.
The Secretary of State was also informed of General Nixon's request.
This drew the reply that the refusal was concurred in : and that the
demand indicated an important offensive movement. No advance
beyond the present theatre of operations would be sanctioned. An
advance to Amara with the object of controlling the tribes between
that place and the Karun, and thus adding to the safety of the pipe
line, might be supported.
" Our present position is strategically a aound one, and we
cannot, at present, afford to take risks by extending it unduly. In
Mesopotamia a safe game must be played."
It is obvious, then, that in the minds of the Home Government, the
original object of the expedition—the safety of the oil—was still para
mount.
Looked at from a broad point of view, it can hardly be doubted that
the attitude of the Secretary of State was absolutely sound.
The day after the telegram was despatched, we were to make our
first landing in Gallipoli. That would be our main theatre against
the Turks. There was also the Suez Canal theatre, which was probably
more important than the Mesopotamian one : for the Sue74 Canal was
a vital artery of our imperial communications. The Mesopotamian
theatre was third in order of importance : moreover we had already
attained our object in sending the expedition. Unfortunately we
were encouraged by success after success steadily to increase our hold
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