'Report from Lieut-General Sir P. H. N. Lake K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commanding I.E.F. "D" on the Defence of Kut-Al-Amarah under Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., 3 December 1915-29 April 1916' [‎11v] (22/44)

20
defile and join hands with him by the left bank. This I shall
attempt to do by the means already proposed namely cross river
with part of my force enfilading enemy and then assaulung his
oosition. I have only just succeeded in completing bridge owing
to extreme difficulty in getting it up from Shaikh Saad . an ^ re ^'
tructing it here on account of storm and torrent of ram the (want
of ?) material and only one company Sappers and Miners. Ihe
country round sea of mud and animals can hardly move. 1 am
usine my utmost endeavours to expedite carrying out plan but it
must be recognised that conditions have been extraordinarily
unfavourable. A com pari son between works in front ot me and
those elsewhere is difficult but these ones cannot be turned except
in a modified manner by enfilading force from opposite bank,
have just heard bridge is broken off again. Addresssd U. H. y.,
repeated 6th Division."
On the 18th January I sent the following wireless in reply to above ; —
" Let me make it clear mv project is not right bank , ' ii'fff>rpd
vour idea after you had met with such difficulties and had suffered
such losses. 1 thought thcre was much in th ®/'S ht b ^ k ' d ^
VOU could plant your guns on right bank en enfilade oi the Turkish
entrenchments on the left bank it should dislodge them especially
as vour fire would force the Turkish ammunition and food convoys
to make a detour northward. No, my project would have been to
have advanced on the left bank with all my force united in my
hand, since the bulk ot hostile force is on left bank. Perhaps 1
should have entrenched a minimum force of two battalions on the
right bank to guard my ships as I did in my action of f > ut l "
September last, on the principle that the enemy must be defeated
in order to gain my objective. It seems to me that if you arrive
here on south bank as suggested m my 69 -97 -G. ot January 1 7th
and aimed your guns east and south ol Kut town on right bank
their enfilading fire would facilitate our crossing the river.
On same date I indicated to the Corps Commander what I should do if he
were unable to relieve me, repeating message to Army Commander ; to attempt
sortie in force on right bank with possibly 3 000 men threatened destruction, as
enetnv in trenches 300 yards from bank must detect the movement and hen
would be destruction when morning came. It means the abandonment ot all
wounded sick, guns, transport, etc. My idea was to fight on till no more
ammunition was left from trench to trench and house to house. I said that I would
have done so when all hope is past, and not till then. Traditions of war in
military history justify a General in making terms on fair conditions, like, for
example lunof's French lorce in Portugal in 1808 who were transported away
in ships with their arms, guns and baggage and landed in France. As long as I
hold Kut I said, enemy cannot take offensive against us towards Amarah as his
steamers'and barges are absolutely necessary. "H you cannot relieve me you
cannot maintain yourself where you are, you would ha\e to retreat.
The rain last night has been heavy and the trenches have two 'jet of water
in them and, in many cases, more, causing much discomfort and hardship
men.
APPENDIX K.
Copy ot a telegram from G. H. Q., to 6ih Division and Corps, No. I oo3-3i6.0., dated 18th
January 191^.
"In reply to your 69-97-G., of 17th.
It would appear you contemplate the practical evacuation of Kut with
abandonment of stores and guns after relieving column has reached
there. This is by no means the intention of Army Commander.
On arrival Avlmer's column our force should be in superior strength
to enemy and neither Kut nor guns nor stores must be abandoned.