'Report from Lieut-General Sir P. H. N. Lake K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commanding I.E.F. "D" on the Defence of Kut-Al-Amarah under Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., 3 December 1915-29 April 1916' [‎11r] (21/44)

19
rather over 15,000 with at the outside 41 guns and you have
twice defeated them. Townshend has been contained by 45th and
51st Divisions, to atlling possibly 8,000 with 17 guns. Towns
hend has reported strong column estimated one division and 13
guns retiring to main camp, west of Kut. Enemy have further
suffered losses estimated by you at 4,500 Shaikh Saad and 2,000
Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. . You therefore should have between you and Kut not more
than 5,000 and possibly 27 guns. The total of your losses should
almost have been made good by reinforcing units. Your bridge
gives you freedom of manoeuvre. The course you originaily
proposed namely to employ part of your force on right bank
should not only promise success but afford you opportunitv of in
flicting severe blow on enemy and effecting speedy relief of
Townshend. I cannot believe that position in front of you can
equal in strength those attacked and captured by us in the past
which had been in preparation for four months. The course you
now propose for Townshend in your telegram under reply would be
disastrous from every point of view, to Townshend's force, to your
force, to the whole of the forces in Mesopotamia and to the
Empire and I cannot sanction it. There is no reason to suppose
enemy has yet been reinforced by a sixth division and the possi
bility of its arrival only emphasises necessity for prompt action.
Both acknowledge. Addressed Corps, repeated 6th Division."
On January 17th, I sent message No. 69-97-G., to Corps Commander to say
1 supposed he would now advance by right bank with his maximum force, leaving
his minimum force entrenched to guard ships ; it was not likely Turks could take
offensive on left bank as long as I held Kut and blocked his steamers and barges,
etc. I reminded him that I had informed him on 7th January in my 69-74-G.
and in my 69 22-G., of 22nd December that it was impossible for me to gam
right bank with rapidity or secrecy unless the relieving force arrived on right
bank south of Kut, where he would be covered from enemy by important
obstacle of Hai, now five feet deep at the ford.
I reckoned that I could put 4,000 men only at the outside across in one
night (that would leave 5,000 more combatants in Kut in addition to wounded,
sick and followers and departmental men).
Animals, officers' chargers and machine gun mules come to about 3,000
and would take three hours a trip ; 25 trips require 75 hours.
Three Field Batteries would require some 20 hours.
But all guns and munitions of war would have to be destroyed, also animals
as none could be crossed in one night which was essential for the success of the
sortie.
The following telegram was received from Corps Commander.
APPENDIX J.
Copy of a telegram from Corps Commander to General Headquarters, No. 11-143-G., dated
17th January 1916.
"Reply to 1008-309-O.
1 understand your telegram to mean to desire me to get to Kut in such a
way as to hold that place together with Townshend at least till
his force can be removed entirely. That is that you do not wish
that Townshend breaking through form any part of my plan. If
this is so, the plan suggested by Townshend is opposed to your
views and in my opinion less likely to succeed than any I suggest
ed as my remaining opposite Kut while Townshend took several
days to get across river would lead to Turks assaulting the place
when half denuded of troops. The only way to relieve Townshend
without the necessity for his breaking out is for me to force the
S164GSD