Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎4v] (8/176)

appropriate precautions during the period of strained relations as will ensure for
the Canal a reasonable degree of immunity from interference by the potential enemy.
4. Unless the mentality of the Japanese undergoes some profound change it is
only reasonable to suppose that she will repeat the tactics of the Russo-Japanese
campaign, and, when she feels that war can no longer be averted, will anticipate its
actual declaration by some act aimed at securing for herself a striking initial
advantage.
The blocking of the Suez Canal would not be difficult of accomplishment, and
would commend itself to a nation whose traditional policy is to strike first and declare
war afterwards.
Such a prelude to the declaration of war would be almost too tempting to resist,
securing as it would strategical advantage of the first magnitude.
5. The strategical problem stated in the most general terms is that the armed
forces on which in the last resort the success of our Imperial policy may depend are
divided from their potential theatre of operations by a channel so narrow that it can
easily be blocked by the sinking of a single ship.
The problem is comparable to that of the United States of America and the
Panama Canal, and to a lesser extent to that of Germany and the Kiel Canal during
the late war
6. The analogy breaks down, however, when the means by which the United
States and Germany have guaranteed the security of these two canals are examined.
Whereas the Governments of these two nations exercised complete control over
the waterways, the approaches thereto, and for the time being over the ships that
used them, Great Britain is only able to influence to a minor degree the course of
events in the Suez Canal, unless, as during the late war, she assumes complete
physical control of the waterway and its banks, thereby infringing Egyptian
neutrality and Article 4 of the Suez Canal Convention.
7. The Naval Staff view with apprehension a state of affairs by which the fruition
of our Naval Imperial Strategy is dependent on the forbearance of a potential
enemy and the goodwill of a commercial company and a neutral and possibly
unfriendly State. They feel, moreover, that the knowledge that our initial Naval
movements can so easily be hampered by an act of sabotage which we are powerless
to prevent is in the end bound to limit appreciably the force and efficiency of British
diplomatic representations which might conceivably be called for in the Far East.
8. By appending her signature to Article XIX of the Washington Treaty for
the Limitation of Naval Armaments the U.S.A. has voluntarily renounced her power
of intervention with armed forces in the Western Pacific, leaving to the British
Empire the task of countering with the requisite Naval forces any aggressive
tendencies on the part of Japan.
9. Under present conditions, however, it would appear that the pressure of
British sea power could at a critical moment be neutralised, and preparations, such
as the establishment of oil-fuel reserves and Naval bases in the East, rendered
abortive by a simple act on the part of Japan requiring little preparation or
foresight. The time factor would be all-important, and the delay imposed on our
Fleet by the blocking of the Canal might admit of the Japanese scoring such striking
initial triumphs, such as the seizure or destruction of Singapore and Hong Kong,
as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for us to wage war with any prospect of
success.
II.—Requirements to Secure an Effective Block.
10. The desiderata in order to secure an effective “block” of the Suez
Canal are—
(a.) The arrangements should be such as will ensure the ship being sunk at the
correct time, i.e., when negotiations between this country and Japan have
reached an advanced stage, but before we have passed our Fleet through
the Canal.
(b.) The ship should be scuttled it i spot in the Canal where the bottom and sides
are rocky.
(c.) The Pilot would have to be overpowered, intimidated or suborned