‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 43. PART I. (From 1st to 14th November 1917.)’ [‎148r] (300/500)

(2) Naval control will still permit of necessary inland work being carried
out. For example, my proposed orders legislate for a daily test of communica
tion between Bombay, Madras, etc., and a station in the interior.
(3) It is an established principle that the W/T Station of a great Ship
ping Port, such as Basrah, must (like its light-house) face seaward.
(4) The desire of the General Officer Commanding to retain Basrah W/T
Station under his control is no doubt founded upon a full desire for efficiency,
but on examining his reasons quoted in your telegram 1283 of the 30th Janu
ary, the following points arise :—
(A) “ It is used for jambing any Interception work going on in Meso
potamia Theatre/’
This reason is not clearly understood. It is presumed, however, that it is
desired to use Basrah W/T Station for jambing enemy W/T communication.
This is not in accordance with the expressed views of the late Army Com
mander, whose representatives, General W. IL Beach* made the following
statement at a W/T Conference held at Baghdad -
“ The main desiderata of the Army (as regards W/T transmission of any
kind) is avoidance of jambing whereby Army special wireless
work (i.e. y interception of enemy messages) is interfered with.
If, however, the policy in this direction has changed, and it « now desired
to jamb rather than to intercept enemy communication, surely Basra /
Station is not so conveniently situated for this purpose as the Military Ixirry
Stations already erected at and around Baghdad. In any case, the indiscri
minate use of Basrah W/T Station for deliberate interference to enemy W/I
communication would cause serious interference to maritime wor , an mi 3
well jamb Distress or Raider messages from Merchant vessels.
(B) “ War Office recently indicated it would be required to com-
municate with Caucasus.”
In my telegram I questioned the probability of W/T communication with
Russian Authorities under existing conditions. If, however, i /•« ’
then the fact of Basrah W/T Station being under Naval control in noway
prevents such communication taking place, though a powerful W/T Station at
Baghdad would be even better.
(C) “ It is also important to retain under military control in view of
possible extensions of Force “ D ” operations, and of temporary
break down of land line between Baghdad and base.
This consideration seems to demand a W/T Station at Baghdad rather than
at Basrah.
(5) As regards W/T communication between Basrah and Baghdad, the
Gunboats at Baghdad can at all times communicate with Basrah, either direct
or through, one other Gunboat situated anywhere on the Tigris below JCut.
This scheme was suggested in conversation to the Director of Army Signals
and Telegraphs with a view to using Gunboats’ W/T to replace the 20 or so
Military W/T Stations on the Tigris line. The idea of this suggestion was with
a view to exercising the Gunboats, but if was rejected on the grounds.
(i) That the 20 Army Stations constituted a more than sufficient
channel of communication.
(n) That a breakdown of land line communication was most unlikely.
(6) May views in this matter are further accentuated by the fact that the
W/T Conference at Bombay, after full consideration, was unanimously m
favour of Coast W/T Stations (including Basrah) being under Naval control.
In view qf its decisions having been reported to vou, I regret that the
matter was not referred to me before you concurred with the General Oincer
Commanding, Force “ D,” in his objections.
(7) The views of the latter can easily be met by inserting the following;
paragraph in proposed East Indies W/T Orders, Appendix IV .
<c The officer iu charge of Basrah W/T Station is to accept any W/T
work communicated to him by ‘ Certain Military Authorities..
In cases where such Military work will interfere with maritime
communication and must he delayed, the Military Authority is
to be informed of the delay and its probable duration..
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