‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 37. PART I. (From 1st to 15th August 1917.)’ [‎201r] (406/488)

64680.
4. Intelligence,-
53326.
54080.
54334.
'2. Euphrates Front .—No change.
3. Busso-Turkish Front .—Kurdish activity against the Russians between
Lake Van and Urmia is apprehended by the
Caucasus General Staff.
Reports of movement of Turkish troops towards Meso
potamia continue, though there is nothing
very definite
5. Fersia .—No change.
6. Folicy .—On 5th August General Maude estimated that the total
numbers, at a liberal estimate, which the Turks might be able to concentrate
against us in the Baghdad area would not exceed 81,500 rifles and 370 guns,
He further stated his opinion that, provided his maintenance requirements
are met, we should be able to deal satisfactorily with the enemy even if his
numbers by the end of September reach the higher figure estimated as possible
by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, viz., 96,000 rifles and 384 guns
6, On 6th August GeneraTMaude wired his conclusion that no sustained
Russian offensive of any weight in the Eastern theatre is probable this winter.
To meet possible developments he proposed to form a new division in Force
“ D,” which involved reinforcement to his force of 3 British battalions, 44 guns
and various subsidiary units The inference to be drawn from this telegram
is that General Maude has abandoned the idea of a strategical offensive up the
Tigris. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff has agreed to the formation
54329< of a new division. The last three of the 7
Territorial Force battalions from India de-
54438- tailed for Egypt are to be diverted to Meso
potamia. 24 field guns are to be sent from India, and 3 I’S" howitzer batteries
will be despatched from England.
On the 9th August the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wired to the
following effect:—
{a) Russian General Headquarters is agreeable to part of Baratoff’s
force, which is to advance in
64 8 ’ the direction of Kifri,
placed under General Maude,
being
(6) A Russian attack in the direction of Mosul is fixed to commenc©
in the middle of October.
(c) In present circumstances we cannot rely on Russian co-operation;
but we should work for co-operation, though we are not likely
to get it.
(d) He concurs with General Maude regarding' the necessity for active
measures, consistent with circumstances, and with the execution
of the policy of His Majesty’s Government, (viz., the security
of our hold on the Baghdad vilayet).
In a telegram, dated 10th August, which probably crossed the above
5 telegram from the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, General Maude gives his
views regarding, a combined Anglo-Russian offensive. The gist of this wire
appears to be :—-
(i) General Maude would welcome such an offensive, but this must
depend on vigorous and sustained Russian co-operation.
(ii) Movement up the Tigris is impossible until the Russian offensive
from the Caucasus, Lake Urmia and Ban eh has made good
progress.
(in) Our progress on the Tigris Front would be regulated to correspond
with Russian movements on Kirkuk-Mosul, by the situation
on the Euphrates and by the speed wdth wTtich w r e could lay our
communications.
(iv) Once Baratoff is re-established on the line of the Diala and the
Russian advance from the Caucasus, Lake Urmia and Baneh
has made good progress, an Anglo-Russian advance to the line
Tekrit-Kifri could be co-ordinated with a general move for
ward by ail the forces engaged.
(v) The best results will follow from offensive action from all directions,
even though it may be half-hearted on the part of the Russians.
(vi) But, as previously stipulated, the offensive must be proceeded with
cautiously, methodically and combinedly.
7. General conclusions .—It is still considered that the general conclusion
arrived at in paragraph 7 of last week’s summary of the situation is the