‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 37. PART I. (From 1st to 15th August 1917.)’ [‎182r] (368/488)

t i.„ ovtent to which I could co-operate would he on the lines indicated in
^ f jitADy No 47789) and £-2053 (2?) (Dy. No. 55565) and would
denend onthe visour and sustained nature of Eussian movements including the
Caucasus Army. Movement up the Tigris would, however,be impossible until the
Sin offensive from Caucasus-Lake Urmia-Bane had become well advanced
to produce simultaneous co-operation between all the forces e'lgased. Our
progress on the Tigris front would be regulated to correspond with the move
ments of the Russians on Kerkuk-Mosul, by the situation on the Euphrates
and by the speed at which we could lay our communications. I am informed by
Baratoff that he would send 13,500 men and 9,000 animals including transport
for the formation of the Dialha Column. Bail y tonnage of supplies for this
force on the Eussian scale would average not more than 80 tons and possibly as
little as 60 tons. Am communicating with Baratoff to ascertain dtfimte y c n-
cerning his figures which are not clear. Daily tonnage would total 80 to 100
tons if an average of 20 tons daily be added for munitions. Since the transport
provided by Baratoff for this column would give it a range of 60 miles
from river or railhead (where I would place supplies and stores), its
maintenance whilst on the Dialha or at Kifn would be possible. Baratoff
“ unable, he states, to increase the transport with this column so
I cannot for the present see my way to maintain it in advance of
Kifri though possibly development of operations and acquisition of ground
up the Tigris might enable me to find means of placing supplies ^or it at new
rail or riverhead within 60 miles of the more forward area. Kifri would,
however, be the extreme limit under P resent ^ conditions. Needless to
say the presence of this column on the Dialha or at Kifri wou e . v
i/protecting my right flank and liberating my troops for action some
where else. It seems doubtful, on the other hand, whether the Russian having
once evacuated the line of the Dialha will be able t
of their forces, again to re-establish themselves there. I shall not be able to
supply this column till it is actually established on the Dialha with its left at
Shahraban and I can provide no land transport to supplement Baratoff s land
transport between rail or riverhead and his troops ; this slwuld be c _y
understood and I am informing Baratoff accordingly. No thUi y ,
experienced in maintaining supply once the column is established as above o
the Dialha, for even if it were driven hack I could draw it in towards my
troops at Baqubah. It is to be considered, m ponnection with affiliating
Eussian column to this Army, whether the association of the Eussians m their
present undisciplined state with our troops is desirable, and this is a serious
question. Giving due consideration to all points of view, I am m favour or
their making an effort to re-establish themselves on the line of the Dialha, and
once there and offensive from Caucasus-Lake TJrmia-Bane has made good
progress, advance to line Kifri-Tekrit could be co-ordinated with general
forward by all the forces engaged. Without such co-operation the DiaLna
column would be too weak to advance on Kifri and contemplation of a further
advance beyond Kifri towards Kirkuk must remain until the situation has
developed and more advanced rail or riverhead for it could be fixed, rrovided
our 102,000 tons which we are now able to handle monthly can be delivered at
Basrah ’ the supply question within Mesopotamia will present no obstacle.
According to revised figures which I have asked . Baratoff for, the amoun
required for Eussians and extra troops asked for in my telegram No. dUOS
(Dy No. 53589), will be 3,600 to 4,500 tons monthly ; this can be adjusted by
us from within the 102,000 tons when notifying our monthly requirements m
advance. Two questions for consideration are that concerning the supply ot
remounts and whether Eussians should provide their own freight for supplies
and munitions as far as Basrah or whether India will provide it as well as sup
plies. Ammunition would of course have to be sent by the Eussians. Delivery o
their drafts at and evacuation of their sick from rail or riverhead fixed tor
their supplies could be carried out by us. The report of the committee wfiicn
is about to assemble will better enable us to say whether the capabilities ot tne
port of Basrah can be further developed. If its capacity can be increased, tbe
problem would be further simplified although I have no information concerning
the availability of freight for putting any increased demands into Basrah, ihere
are some disadvantages as regards attachment of Eussian troops^ to this torce
but these are outweighed in my opinion by the advantages of having our right
flank covered, assuming always that the Eussians will fight.. The best results
will follow, I feel sure, from offensive action from all directions, even though
it may be half-hearted on the part of the Eussians. It wiH get u , s .
away from Baghdad and give us room to manoeuvre. Baghdad is difficult to
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