File 4722/1918 Pt 8 'Mesopotamia: Situation' [‎324r] (660/995)

(P 6060)
From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 5th August 1920. 703
(Received 9th, 8 a.m.)
(R.) 9450. Your telegram dated 2nd August, Causes of present rising.
My telegrams for last 18 months have recorded steady inflow of propaganda from
Syria and to a less degree from Turkey, supported by ample funds. See particularly
my telegram dated 15th May, No. 5803. So long as our military weakness was not
apparent, this propaganda, the objects of which were largely foreign to ideas of
people at large, had little success, except in Baghdad,' Kerbela and Najaf, where
sentimental leaders have always been more or less in sympathy with idea of pure
Islamic state, vide my telegram of 26th January 1919, No. 1076.
It was not, however, until our enemies in Syria demonstrated to people of
Mesopotamia that we could be dislodged by (corrupt grouping up that movement
became dangerous. We successively evacuated l)air-az-Zor and Albu Kamal and
Alquim, on each occasion under pressure from Syrian Government,
Trains were derailed between Baghdad and Mosul, and our officers were
murdered at Tel Afar. Public confidence in our ability to maintain ord#r began to
wane. Extremists began to hope that they might be successful in attaining their
object, viz., complete independence and freedom from all foreign interference, by
direct action. Kerbela and Najaf became principal centres of agitation. (It will be
remembered that I had to deport a number of men from Kerbela in September 1919
to prevent a rising, and Najaf was scene of disturbance in 1918.)
The arrest of Mirza Mohammed Riza and others at Kerbela in June, and of
certain, minor personages at Hillah, stabilised the situation in Hillah division, but,
owing to our military weakness, we were unable to take similar action in Shamiyah
division, where we only had some 300 men and two guns.
This division, which has always borne a bad reputation, vide Administration
Report for 1918, became focus of intrigues.
Meanwhile, the announcement of terms of peace with Turkey had, as anticipated,
an unfavourable effect on public opinion, and it enabled extremists to rally to their
cause much useful material in the form of ex-Turkish officials and (corrupt group)
large body of public opinion, who wished for maintenance of Turkish Empire, and
resented acquisitions of Greece. Coming as it did at beginning of Ramazan, and
synchronizing with our evacuation of Enzeli and Resht, and reports of Bolshevik
successes in other parts of the world, it gave extremists an opportunity, of which
they were not slow immediately to avail themselves, to represent us on the one
hand as pursuing an anti-Mamie policy, and on the other hand as rapidly growing
weaker.
At this point other foreign influences commenced to make themselves felt,
notably United States Consul and other United States citizens who, I have every
reason to know, make it their business to convey to extremists in detail all references
in English Press unfavourable to Local and Imperial policy of His Majesty’s Govern
ment, notably articles from the Times which are freely referred to by extremists in
their public speeches and conversations. In this connection we know that 7,000Z. in
Turkish gold reached extremists in Kerbela during May and June.
Certain Shamiyah Chiefs, whom we were, as already explained, unable to arrest,
directed their energies to cause a rising in Samawah Rumaitha area, realising easily
that this is the most vulnerable point in our communications in Mesopotamia. This
area has never been penetrated by our troops and is in fact impenetrable ; for the
past year it has been in an unsatisfactory state, see my Despatch dated 20th July,
No. 21256, reporting events leading up to recent punitive expedition there.
The outbreak occurred at Rumaitha on 3rd June ; had w^e been able to despatch
troops in adequate numbers promptly to the rising, it would not, I think, have spread,
and situation in Shamiyah, where no rising took place for another 15 days, would