File 4722/1918 Pt 8 'Mesopotamia: Situation' [‎123r] (256/995)

Septembsr 21st 1920.
THE BAGHDAD TIMES.
RAILWAY departmental
DINNER.
magnificent work of the
DIREOTORATE.
SPEECH BY THE ACTING CIVIL
COMMISSIONER.
The Acting Civil Commissioner, Sir A. T.
Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., was
the guest of the Railway Department at the
Maude Hotel last evening.
In the course of a speech, Colonel G.
Lubbock, C.M.G., D.S.O., Director of Railways,
paid a glowing tribute to the untiring labours
of Sir A. T. Wilson in this country, and ex
pressed the sincere regret felt by every branch
of the Administration of ‘ Iraq at his approach
ing departure.
Sir A. T. Wilson, replying to. Col. Lubbock,
sa i<I: “ 1 feel 1 owe it to the Railway Direc
torate, whose guest 1 am this evening, to record
the satisfaction with which 1 received last
March the decision of His Majesty’s Govern
ment to transfer railways in this country to the
Civil Administration.
Adverse conditions have since arisen to which
1 will refer later, but these cannot obscure the
magnificent work already done by the Direc
torate. No Department has a better war re
cord, and my only regret is that a fresh war has
prevented equally striking peace achievements,
but I am sure that this wall follow. With Col.
Lubbock as your Director, and as Heads of
Departments Mr. Rothera, Mr. lainsh and Mr.
Kiernander, whose wide experience and high
qualifications are known beyond the limits of
Mesopotamia, we need have no fear as to the
future.
The record of every grade and Department
of the Railway Directorate during these past few
difficult months has been most creditable and
worthy of the high traditions of British and
Indian Railways, and of the British Army ot
which at one time or another you have most ot
you been an integral part. The notable services
rendered by drivers, guards, workshop foremen
and administrative staff of the Railway both
British and Indian, have repeatedly been
brought before my notice both by Military and
Civil Authorities in this country, and were the
subject of a special reference in the Indian
Legislative Council a few days ago.
I thank you once more Col. Lubbock for what
you have said. I thank you all again for the
very kind reception you have given to vo .
Lubbock’s remarks, and I wish you one and all
success in the great tasks still before you.
I now turn to current events m this country.
The last few months have saddened us al ;
doubt has replaced hope. Why, we ^ should
these things have occurred? I heheve the truth
to be that the world is swayed now, even ™ (
than of old, by moral rather than by material
forces; by ideas and theories rather than by
Governments and facts. lime was
which had their birth m the East had a I
found influence on Western thought,
now seeing the opposite process at work.
The kh Century witnessed the revival o
Nationalism in Europe and ^kV^im the
the man in the field and m he street from the
conception and existence o o < . in
The people had their part m these Ejupn^ni
which the common interests rathei
differences of the component parts were e
phasized, but they could not see it ^ hey pre
ferred something smaller which j t
to be their own. Nationalism ^ the bajs ot the
and no
idea appealed more widely to the many races
SSL ^as were
silenced; doubters were perforce dumb N atm
leaders, emphasized this as the las,
1K The seed of Nationalism was sown broadcast
at home, but the Army that landed at Basrah n
1914 was animated by no such ideas 0u V^_
sion was to beat the Turk and we <h " he
while to quote Lord Hardinge s wo ■ „ , .
visited Basrah in 1915, “ We were not fig mg
single handed and we could not lay down plans
for the future without a full exchang ,
with our Allies, but we were confident that
henceforth a more benign Administration
would bring back to Mesopotamia that pros
perity to which her rich potentialities gave tier
so clear a title.”
On this nebulous basis we went ahead until
the capture of Baghdad. The seed of Nation
alism had grown in Europe meanwhile, and the
plant had borne fruit in the East. The Sharif’s
revolt was proclaimed as a national movement
of Arabs against the Turks, and in return for
the co-operation of Arab forces the Allies
pledged themselves to respect and further Arab
aspiration. The prowess of the armed Forces of
the Crown in Mesopotamia resulting in the cap
ture of Baghdad, and the devoted labours of the
officers of the Civil Administration made it pos
sible for His Majesty’s Government to conceive
as a practicable possibility the application to
Mesopotamia of the policy enunciated by
General Maude in 1917, and lately embodied in
the Turkish Peace Treaty, viz., the creation of
independent State from those parts of the
Turkish Empire inhabited mainly or wholly by
non-Turkish races.
Each fresh victory in Mesopotamia involved
a further advance inland until as a result of the
armistice we found ourselves responsible for the
Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah,
pledged to the policy enunciated by General
Maude, but still unable without reference to our
Allies to give effect thereto. It was not until 6
months after the armistice that the application
to Mesopotamia of the mandatory system as
laid down in the Peace Treaty was decided, and
nearly a. year after the armistice we were warn
ed against doing anything in Mesopotamia
which might give rise to the impression that
the future political status of Mesopotamia had
been decided, or that the decisions of the Peace
Conference were being prejudged. At the
same time we were given reason to hope that
peace with Turkey would be concluded no J
later than the autumn.
Our local action was thus limited to carrying
on an administration. We in Mesopotamia could
not build, though in Syria an Arab Govern
merit, practically independent, was got up im
mediately after the armistice, which coincided
with the eviction of the Turks from Aleppo and
Syria attained complete independence on the
evacuation of that country by our forces in
November, 1919. Thus while in Mesopotamia
our hands were tied by the long delay in ^ the
conclusion of peace with Turkey, in Syria
the pledges given by the Allies had already
reached fulfilment. This discrepancy of treat
ment gave rise to active propaganda on the one
hand and not unnatural discontent in certain
quarters on the other. We had been told that
we could not act until the Peace Conference had
come to a decision. The months passed and
peace with Turkey still tarried pending the
decision of the United States as to whether they
would undertake the mandate for any part of
Turkey. On our borders there was war. Meso
potamia itself was quiet, but the seed we our
selves had sown was growing; the new wine was
fermenting in the old bottles. The temporary
military administration and continuance of war
conditions in the large towns became extremely
irksome to certain classes, but we could do little
to guide the growth of public opinion. Our
orders were clear: we were not to build. We
could not know what the Peace Conference
would decide, but we could, and did foresee that
delay meant trouble. Demobilisation however
went on until on May 1st last we only had 5 000
British and 30,000 Indian combatants m Meso-
THE ROAD TO PEACE IN
MESOPOTAMIA.
potamia. , ■ ,, ■,
During this month the Supreme Council ol
the Peace Conference conferred the Mandate
for Mesopotamia on Great Britain, hut no deci
sion as to the form of Government to be set up ;
that was held to involve consultation with local
opinion—no easy task. It was at this _ critica
moment in the history ot Mesopotamia that
certain men, more ambitious, more short-sighted,
move impatient and less wise than others, savv
fit to foment under a constitutional guise
movement which within two months became
frankly revolutionary, fanatical and anarchic.
In July the outbreak came ami with R destrue-
lion of life and property, iron, which the conn-
trv will take years to recover, rhe worst is
believe now o'ver. With more troops, cooler
weather and with the advent of the ploughing
season, there is good reason to believe that the
present disturbances will abate and will be
finally suppressed. That they shall e !,U P
(Continued on page 4, column 1.)
(By Col. T. E. LAURENCE) ^
There is a feeling in England that the French *
occupation of Damascus and their expulsion of
Feisul from the throne to which the grateful
Syrians had elected him is, after all, a poor re
turn for Feisal’s gifts to us during the war: and
the idea of falling short of an oriental friend in
generosity leaves an unpleasantness in our
mouths. Peisal’s courage and statesmanship
made the Mecca revolt spread beyond the Holy
cities, until it became a very active help to the
allies in Palestine. The Arab army, created in
the field, grew from a mob of Bedouins into an
organised and well-equipped body of troops.
They captured thirty-five thousand Turks, dis
abled as many more, took a hundred and fifty
guns, and a hundred thousand square miles of
OttoiAn territory. This was great service in our
extreme need, and we felt we owed the Arabs a
reward: and to Feisal, their leader, we owed
double, for the loyal way in which he had ar
ranged the main Arab activity when and where
Allenby directed.
Yet we have really no competence in this matter
to criticise the French. They have only followed
in very humble fashion, in their sphere of Syria,
the example we set them in Mesopotamia.
England controls nine parts out of ten of the
Arab world, and inevitably calls the tune to
which the French must dance, if we follow an
Arab policy, they must be Arab. If we fight the
Arabs, they must fight the Arabs. It would
show a lack of humour if we reproved them for
a battle near Damascus, and the blotting out of
the Syrian essay in self-government, while we
were fighting battles near Baghdad, and trying
to render the Mesopotamians incapable of self-
government, by smashing every head that raised
itself among them.
MILITARY METW)DS.
A few weeks ago the chief of our administra
tion in Baghdad was asked to receive some Arab
notables who wanted to urge their case for partial
autonomy. He packed the delegation with some
nominees of his own and, in replying, told
them t.Imi it would be.lona; before they were fit
lor responsibility. Brave words—but the burden
of them has been heavy on the Manchester men
this week at Hillah.
These risings take a regular course. There
is a preliminary Arab success, then British re
inforcements go out as a punitive force. They
fight their way (our losses aj$. slight, the Arab
losses heavy) to their objectj^ which is mean
while bombarded by artillery, aeroplanes, or
gunboats. Finally, perhaps, a village is burnt
and the district pacified. It is odd that we do
not use poison gas on these occasions. Bombing
the houses is a patchy way of getting the women
and children, and our infantry always incur
losses in shooting down the Arab men. . By gas
attacks the whole population of offending dis
tricts could be wiped out neatly; and as a
method of government it would be no more im
moral than the present system.
We realise the burden the army in Meso
potamia is to the Imperial Exchequer, but we do
not see as clearly the burden it is _ to Meso
potamia. It has to be fed, and all its animals
have to be fed. The fighting forces are now
eighty-three thousand strong, but the ration
strength is three hundred thousand. There are
three labourers to every soldier, to supply and
serve him. One in ten of the souls in Mesopo
tamia to-day belongs to our army. The green
ness of the country is being eaten up by them,
and the process is not yet at its height. To be
safe they demand that we double our existing
o-arrison. As local resources are exhausted tins
increase of troops will increase the cost by more
than an arithmetical progression.
A DANGEROUS POSITION.
These troops are just for police work to hold
down the subjects of whom the House of Lords
was told two weeks ago that they were longing
for our continued presence in their country.
No one can imagine what will be our state the e
if one of Mesopotamia’s three envious neigh
hours (all nursing plans against us) attacks m
from outside, while there is still disloyalty with- ^
in Our communications are very bad, oui dc-
fence positions all have both flanks m the air,
and there seem to have been two mcidents late^
We do not trust our troops as we did during the
war.