‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 32. PART II. (From 16th to 31st March 1917.)’ [‎23r] (50/294)

tv“J i?0 oV n H h9 Jhe reported withdrawal of German personnel
“ ^. a fu . rth ® r indication of an abandonment of Turkish attempts to
regain a footing m the Baghdad ai-ea for the present.
^^Lrl i0 V f ^ 111 wMch General Maude c an best afford
theSpf nf ih e T RuSS1 ^ S n asbee ? c i n l dei ' edseparatel y- 14 seems clear that
BriS fl f e I mpem .- Ge n era l Staff contemplates no extension of the
extonln ff ° P , eratl0 v.? b % on * the Baghdad Vilayet. Nor does any such
entan fmW I W desirablt '- A British move northwards on Mosul would
remhtf & t A on our , administrative resources, and would almost certainly
v v q r f® a railway onwards from Baghdad to support it. Mosul is 230 miles
hulk Of ^ fr0 - m Ba » b dad and the river is probably impassable by the great
oulk of our river craft above Samarrah. J &
a r> ov^ ? rltlsb advance up the Euphrates towards Jerablus seems too stupendous
EeS Tilf T^r 81 ^' S t rk ! U8ly ' dorablus is oW miles by river above
tes k most b -f US 'f reached wo can do the Turks no harm. The Euphra
tes is most difficult, if not impossible to navigate up-stream bv any river craft
luteF/essentiaf ^ t0 SUpp0rt the advancing force would‘seem to be abso-
O u .r immediate task in Mesopotamia seems to be to consolidate thoroughly
to Baghdad 11 “iff Baghdad area and to hurry on the construction of the railway
to Baghdad. If later the Russians occupy Mosul and thereby we are in a nosi-
be beSS ^ r0 . m Mesopotamia, it is considered that these troops could
Wn if fkow d n rein o J cul ? General Murray’s force for the Syrian camp
aign, if the War Council does not require them for operations in Europe. 1
E. E. G. T (aibot), —18-3-17.
«lusio I n2 0 abo 0 ve alt0gether aSree With ^ VknVS ex I ,rcsscd in the general con-
I ) 1 r e se A the Turkish army in Asia Minor is containing, if nothing more
Asi M 1 l e th l f. e i I f' LlS f 0 " B l rl r Sb ' forOeS ' Tlle im mediate task of the Allied forces in
-Asia is the defeat and elimination of this Turkish army, thereby freeing the
A Hied forces opposing it to throw their weight on to the main theatre of war
frr k ° d ° u^ 18 ’ + pm pi ‘ loks at the Tui ' ks fr °m various directions distant
of t^P wknli p r r 0t SUffi0e - A successful offc nsive and advance westward
anupLTk f 1 fi?T an - Caacasus ar 1 m 7 18 necessary. In such an ad van ce it would
appear that the Russians have a claim to our assistance and co-operation on
G e s puthern flank. A British advance up the Euphrates, apart from the
difficulties entaded, would be of little use for direct co-operation with a Rus-
enTble pff S1V f®' An - advan ? e , 011 A® Mosul-Ras-el-Ain line, would, however,
enable effective assistance to be rendered to the Russians. Such an advance
would not only traverse supply areas, but enable us to reap the fruits of Turkish
railway and road construction work which has been in progress in this region. I n
all probability the Russians from the Rowanduz region will reach Mosul before
we could do so, but it would appear that we should be prepared to advance and
relieve them there, and so enable the Russians to concentrate larger forces
against the enemy further north. Such an advance up the Tigris would leave
if C ti EU rffi at u- lne ,°]i en f ° r a Turklsh counter-stroke by that line. In view
the difficulties of this route, the presence of the Syrian Arabs to the south
risk totSr ° n the TigriS t0 the n0rfch ’ this d06S n ° t a PP ea v to be a serious
The immediate and urgent need in Mesopotamia at present, apart from con
solidating our position at Baghdad and exploiting its resources, appears to be to
push on railway construction to Baghdad and collect material for an advance
eyond with all speed. _ The Nasiriyah-Kut route, owing to the possibility of
simultaneous construction from several points, appears indicated as the best line
and the doubling of the Basrak-Nasmyah section is worth consideration The
promised output from Tata’s of 75 miles of rails a month is insufficient for this
fvi ,?? lles a month which would enable construction from three points also
the doubling of the Basrah-Nasiriyah lines to proceed simultaneously, would
appear to be more what should be aimed at. To supply this amount from
India, the dismantling of some existing lines, would probably be necessary.
W, E. R. D(ickson),— 19-3-17.