‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 22. PART II. (From 16th to 31st May 1916).’ [‎106r] (216/246)

(b) General Gorringe—strength 1,430 sabres, 27,540 rifles and 155
556C6 guns—holds the line Dajaileh-Magasis on
the right bank and confronts the Sannai-
yat position on the left bank.
On 24th, 25th and again on 27th, General Gorringe reported that move-
55854 ment of transport indicated possibility of
K6143 Turkish withdrawal on the left bank
and on the last mentioned date it was re-
5 $ 582 ported that there were indications of
further withdrawals from Sannaiyat although that position was still held. On
■ nQ 28th it was reported that the bridge over
9 the Hai was still held.
2. General Lake reports that the road between Qurnah and Amarah is
g5834 now fit for traffic by troops and A. T.
carts, and the road Amarah to Shaikh
Sa’ad temporarily passable by all arms.
3. Goneral Baratoff at Kasr-i-Shinn has been instructed to suspend opera
tions in face of a superior enemy and to
retire if necessary.
The General Officer Commanding, Force <c D,” estimates the force opposing
General Baratoff to consist of—
56063
56569
6th Division ,
2nd Division
Murattah Division
5.500
6.500
4.500
Total . 16,500 rifles
Cavalry Brigade of 1,700 sabres and 27 guns, exclusive of guns with 6th
Division.
In addition to the above, the 22nd Begiment is understood to be pro
ceeding to the Khanikin front.
4. All is quiet on the Euphrates line, in Arabistan and at Bushire.
5. On the 22nd May, General Gorringe reported his in ability to drive the
55425 Turks out of the Sannaiyat position with
out incurring heavy casualties, and in
forwarding this report the General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” referred to
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff’s instructions* to the effect that General
* B1399 Lake should be ready to take advantage of
any weakness on the part of the enemy,
provided heavy losses were not risked.
On the 23rd May, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed His
5 562 6 Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that
he did not consider that he could usefully
supplement the above instructions.
On the 24th May, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in reply to the
657o9 Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated
that:—
(a) The information appeared to indicate that the Turkish plan was to
hold General Gorringe in the vicinity of Kut with inferior
strength sufficiently long to enable the Turks to concentrate
superior strength against Baratoff at Kasr-i-Shirin.
(b) In order to co-operate with the Bussians and also to improve our
own position, both militarily and politically, an offensive by
General Gorringe was indicated as the correct course. Nor was it
considered that heavy losses would result from such a course.
On the 25th May, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff stated that, for
56063 the present situation, he considered his
previous instructions to General Lake to be
sufficient and as full as he could appropriately make them. At the same time,
he added that “it would be undoubtedly of advantage to co-operate effectively
with the Bussians and improve our military position on the Tigris, and if this
can be done compatibly with Lake’s mission, Lake can certainly do it. As to
this, the man on the spot alone can form an opinion.