‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 22. PART II. (From 16th to 31st May 1916).’ [‎105r] (214/246)

Telegram P., No. 1119-23-0., dated 28th May 1916. APPENDIX 401
(Despatched 7-35 p.m., received 10 p.m., 29th May 1916.) {By. No. 56708)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
Your 56311 of 27th May.
As vou were informed in my telegram of 22nd May, No. 129-440-O»
(-*¥ No. 55425), Gorringe on that date did not consider that he could drive
enemy out of his positions on left bank without suffering heavy losses, and
though the fact that the comparatively weak Russian Khaniqin Column would
soon find itself confronted by superior forces was realised by me, I have not
felt justified in accordance with telegram No. 15955 (Dy. No 51399), dated
30th April, from Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London, in urging
Gorringe to assume a more active offensive.
2. The strength of the Turkish Forces opposing Gorringe as estimated by
you agrees with my estimate approximately, though the Turks confronting
Baratoff are estimated by me to be under 19,000 strong, including guns and
cavalry and excluding Rowanduz Area.
3. Gorringe is being asked by me what he can do on the lines suggested
in your telegram under reply, though I do not think that there is any material
difference between the situation to-day and that reported on 22nd, and, as
regards material, Gorringe is not in a position to bridge the Tigris at Magasis
without dismantling his bridge at Shaikh Sa’ad or Falahiyah.
4. A stroke across the Hai against the enemy’s bridge at Shumran is a
more possible line of action. On 22nd May, I suggested this to him, but he
reported that at that time hie land transport was insufficient to enable him to
maintain across the Hai a force of any size, and furthermore that the move
ment of cavalry would be considerably restricted by floods on the right bank
of the Tigris upstream of Hai,
5. My direct communication with Baratoff was specifically limited, as you
are aware, to intelligence regarding the enemy by the instructions contained
in telegram No. 14640-Cipher M. O. (Dy. No. 44889), of 22nd March from
Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Any co-ordinating offensive action by me
in direct communication with Baratoff was precluded by these instructions
combined with those contained in telegram No. 15955 (Dy. No, 51399),
of 30th April from Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London. The Grand
Duke is aware of this I presume.
6. Unless my telegram of 10th May, No. 1032-14-0. (Dy. No. 53310),
repeated to the Grand Duke by the C. I G. S. to whom it was addressed, I do
not know what telegram of mine is referred to by Hanbury Williams
7. I was not aware either that the Russian Kirmanshah Column under
took its advance solely from an unselfish desire to assist me.
8. I learnt from C. I. G. S., London, on 24th April, when I was up at
Tigris front, that Baratoff’s advance was fixed to commence on 28th April.
Not knowing whether information regarding the situation at Rut had been
communicated to the Russians, I wired to C. I. G. S., London, on 27th April,
suggesting that the imminence of the surrender of Kut should be immediately
notified to the Russian Government. However the policy of their advance
was not apparently modified by the information.
Addressed India ; repeated London.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., M. S. V., G. S. (M. 0. 2).
SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA. APPENDIX 402
29th May 1916.
On the Tigris line the relative British and Turkish positions remaining
practically what they were a week ago, viz .—
(a) The Turks according to the
information received, strength not ex
ceeding 17,000 rifles and 64 guns, are
holding the line of the Hai southward
of Kut and the Sannaiyat position on.
the Tigris left bank ;
55425
55586
55603
55854
56143
56327