‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 22. PART II. (From 16th to 31st May 1916).’ [‎76r] (156/246)

Addressed Basrah ; repeated Egypt and India.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., M. S. V., E. and P.", G. S. (M. 0. 1, M. 0. 2).
Telegram P., No. 345-51-0., dated 25th May 1916. APPENDIX 357
(Despatched 6 p.m., received 10-30 a.m., 26th May 1916.) (ity. No. 56046)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
53563 of 12th May.
As a preliminary step it is preferred to establish a Central School at Basrah,
and shall he much obliged if two officers and six non-commissoned officers
can be sent to form the nucleus of this school. Am unwilling to send them
for instruction to India owing to paucity of officers.
Working copy to G. S. (S, D. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., M. S. V., G. S. (M. 0. l) M. 0. 2).
Memo. No. 150-3-Q., dated 5th May 1916. ' APPENDIX 358i
(Received 26th May 1916.) (%. No. 56052)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D, ” Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
With reference to the confidential report {Dy. No. 57304) 9 dated 26th April
1916, rendered by Colonel H. A. Young, Director of Ordnance Inspection, to
the Director General of Ordnance in India, I beg to record the following obser
vations :—
2. I consider Colonel Young’s note relative to “ difficulties of transport
and storage ” is a most valuable document, demonstrating, as it does, by the
personal observation of an independent and impartial witness, the great
difficulties which exist in this country in efficiently maintaining the require
ments of the striking force actually engaged with the enemy and which I
venture to think are not always accorded their full f value, in the absence of
personal experience.
3. I have repeatedly been compelled to invite attention, relative to the
reserve of ammunition which should be maintained in Mesopotamia, to the fact
that an unpreventible accident or mishap on the Tigris may seriously, either
by total loss or partial damage, delay the arrival of the required ammu
nition at the actual front. Colonel Young, during his tour of inspection up
the Tigris, actually witnessed such an occurrence.
4. In regard to paragraph 10 of Colonel Young’s note referred to above,
he is under an erroneous impression when he states that there is no system of
transport stages in regard to transmission of stores from any intermediate
camp to the front. His statement, at the time he made it, was, of itself,
doubtless correct. But it was due to the fact, not that the system does not
exist, but that the situation, which then existed at the front, combined with
paucity of river transport, necessitated the forwarding through, direct from
Basrah to the front, of all ammunition, ordnance stores, etc., required.
Amarah has been, and still is, the intermediate Ordnance Stores Dep6t, and
as soon as the situation permits, it will again be stocked with the necessary
reserves
5. In regard to paragraph 6 of the above referred to note, orders have al
ready been issued with a view to improving the arrangements for the speedy
hanking in of river craft, and unloading of the same, but Colonel Young has
perhaps hardly realised to their full extent the difficulties entailed by the strong
current of the river, its shallowness near the banks, and the difficulty of
foretelling the precise hour of arrival of a steamer.
6. I am sorry I was not aware of Colonel Young’s presence at Grab Shallow vessel with a projecting bow. or
at the front on the dates mentioned. Otherwise, I should have made a point
of seeing him. .
Working copy to D. G. O.
Copy to M S. C., G. S. (M. 0. 2),