‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 22. PART II. (From 16th to 31st May 1916).’ [‎57r] (118/246)

rpglegram P-j No. 55709, dated 24th. May 1916.
Despatched 5-30 p.m.)
From—The Commander-in-Chief in India,
To—The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London.
Clear the line.
Your No. 16975-Cipher (Dy. No. 55626), dated 23rd May.
The strategy of the Turks should he make to use of the floods, the Tigris
and the Hai to enable a force of inferior strength to hold Gornnge sufficiently
long for them to concentrate against and heat Baratofl.
That a general plan on above lines is being adopted is indicated by informa
tion regarding their movements and dispositions against Gornnge.
The upstream passage of the river would he blocked and we should thus be
forced to use land transport, for operations on the Hai if ^ fl ank P oslh ° n
held at Sannaiyat and Nakhailat and it is possible tha, their own ictrcat
towards Jason would he secured at the same time. .
The Turks should be forced out of Sannaiyat under danger of isolation, and
operations against the Hai afterwards should be facilitated it ^oriinge
transfer a sufficient force to the left bank, say near Magasis.145 & uns ^ 540
rifles and 1,4?0 sabres were reported yesterday to be the strength of the f
under Gorringe. It is estimated here that the strength and disposition of
Turkish Force is as follows :—
(a) Against or moving against Baratoff 50 guns, 20,000 rifles and 1,700
1 sabres in addition to troops opposing Russians at Rowanduz.
(b) Against Gorringe 66 guns and 17,000 rifles at most.
Therefore a plan such as the one outlined above could be carried out by
him and heavy bosses should not result while the results of its accomphs ment
would be toimprove our position, both militarily and poi ica y, ^^
about effective co-operation with the Russians. T ere Force”* I) ” anc [ jf
this proposal and its desirability be put before the G. O. C., Torce ^ ^nd
he considers it feasible and the best adapted to the situation, he should
directed to carry it out.
2u
appendix 327
(%. No. 5570V)
The output of the line of the communications is increasing ^ owing to better
organisation and arrival of craft; latest reports regarding Gorrmge s ammum-
tion and supplies are satisfactory.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 1)»
Copy to M S. C., M. S. V., G. S (M. O. 3).
Telegram P., No. 3-4-36-A. G., dated 23rd May 1916. APPENDIX^ 328
(Despatched 6-50 p.m., received 11-30 a.m., 24th May 1916.) {Dt/- No. oo/41)
From—-The Adjutant General, Base, Force ** D, Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
Herewith effective strengths for British and Indian troops for 15th May
received up to date, reference your 51860 of 3rd May. Remainder will he
forwarded on receipt. Action is being taken to expedite despatch of return
by units. . .
The figures for British units are to be read British officers, British troops;
for Indian units Indian officers, Indian troops
Regiment.
B. Os.
I. Os.
B. R.
I. R.
Ship.
14th Hussars .
• •
•
.
27
...
442
...
Chakdara 16-4-16.
15th Lancers .
<> •
• •
.
...
13
...
206
Bandra 1-5-16.
12th Cavalry .
# #
.
•
...
18
...
516
Teesta 19-3-16.
23rd Cavalry .
C* •
.
•
t € •
13
...
481
Barpeta 17-2-16.
7 th Lancers
. a
.
•
...
20
543
hrinpura 17-3-16.
6th Cav. Bde. Ammn. Col. .
•
•
1
...
35
51