‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 22. PART II. (From 16th to 31st May 1916).’ [‎45r] (94/246)

5. On 13th May a Russian force drove the Turks from Rowanduz, some
85 miles north-east of Mosul, and on the
y. o. 54389. Khanikin road General Baratoff has occu-
Dy. No. 55113. pied a position to the south-west of
Kasr-i-Shirin. A detachment of 3 officers
and 110 Cossacks arrived at Ali Gharbi on 20th having traversed Pusht-i-Kuh.
Two Russian officers are on their way to join the staff of General Officer Com
manding, Force “ D,” and it has been suggested that a British officer should
]oin General Baratoff’s force.
6. There has been no change in the situation on the Euphrates line or in
Arabist an.
7. It has been decided that no military action should be taken at present
on the Bushire Hinterland, where the climatic conditions are very bad during
the next few months. Sir Percy Lake has also negatived a proposal by the
General Officer Commanding, Bushire, to release our prisoners at Ahram, action
which was concurred in by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The
Cavalry regiment and two battalions en route from Egypt have been directed to
Basrah.
8. The information received from the Tigris line points to a general
Turkish withdrawal up the river, probably as a result of the Russian menace
against the Turkish communications. It also tends to confirm our opinion
that no early reinforcement is being expected by the enemy in Mesopo
tamia.
A withdrawal to a position nearer Baghdad will enable the Turks to act
more quickly on interior lines against the Russians and ourselves, and it will
simplify their supply arrangements. It will, however, have a bad political
effect from the enemy’s point of view on the Arabs and in Persia.
Any retirement on the part of the enemy should be vigorously followed
up by the Tigris Corps. Operations at this time of the year will be very ardu
ous and flood conditions will make them difficult, also the lengthening of the
river communications will add to the difficulties of maintenance. It is, however,
essential that pressure should continue to be exerted on the enemy so that they
will not be able to spare many additional troops for use against the Russians.
213
Should the enemy withdraw from Kut, it should be possible largely to
reduce our force at Nasiriyah.
Eor active operations at the end of the flood season, our forces should be
rendered mobile by the provision of adequate land transport, to enable them
to act away from the river.
9, Presumably the Chief of the Imperial General Staff will issue instruc
tions as to the course to be followed by General Officer Commanding,
Eorce “ D,” in the event of the Turkish withdrawal from Kut eventuat-
ing.
S. G. Loch,— 23-5-1916.
The situation is that a Turkish force of probably 40,000 rifles with 116
guns has to deal, from a central position, with forces :—
{a) British —possibly 30,000 rifles with 150 guns.
(5) Bussian —(Baratoff’s Column) possibly 13,000 rifles (mostly
mounted) and 32 guns, while another force at a rough guess 12,000
rifles and 26 guns—moving into the line Erbil-Kirkur—is dis
tracting attention, complicating plans and possibly inducing
dispersion.
The prolonged stand, apparently in strength on the left bank of the Tigris,
points to Turkish anxiety to gain time for dealing with (&), which may by this
date have to meet a concentration of double its strength.
On account of its position its complete defeat should be difficult and
success costly, but strenuous action is none the less necessary to reduce the
Turks’ time limit for dealing with Baratoff.
2. The effect of inundation is shown on the accompanying map. Oper
ations up stream from Kut, which depend on the river for supply, will be, as
before, up a defile—the difficulty of forcing which will depend on the oppos
ing force and on the front available for manoeuvre when it is met.
Chief of the General Staff,
A. Skeen, —23-5-16.