‘WAR DIARY. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA. […] I.E.F. “D”. Volume 15. PART II. (From 16th to 31st October 1915.)’ [‎62r] (128/306)

by a withdrawal. He is strongly in favour of holding Baghdad if reinforce
ments are forthcoming It they are not forthcoming, he prefers the safety of
the Kut-al-Amarah position. He feels, however, that the present military
situation is such that it may at any time become necessary to occupy Baghdad,
even with our existing forces, and accept the risks involved.
My own comment upon the Commander-in-Chiefs view is that, from a
political point of view r , it would be disastrous to be driven out of Baghdad.
(3) Remain in a defensive position at Kul-al-Amarah. This is a course
that does not appeal to us, for it shows weakness which will be re
cognised both by the Turks and the tribes, and may force our
hands into advancing after all.
Having placed these alternatives before you, I leave the question with
confidence for His Majesty’s Government to decide; but I trust that the deci
sion will be in favour of alternative No. (1),
Record copy to G. S (M. 0. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., G. S. (M. O. 2, M. O. 3).
Telegram P., dated 21st October 1915. APPENDIX 386
(Received in War Section on 22nd October 1915.) (-fty* ^o. koGSd)
From—The Secretary of State for India,
To—The Viceroy of India.
Clear the Line. Private. Baghdad advance. The report of the combined
staffs estimates that. General b ixon has only some 9,000 Turkish troops and
some irregulars to deal with for the next 2 months ; that Turkish forces may be
somewhat increased by the end of the year and they might conceivably
reach a total of 60,000 by the end of January, and oven larger figures during
1916. They consider if re-inforced by 2 Indian divisions from I ranee he
might with assistance of river Flotilla face risk of attack by 60,000 but
there would remain possibility of enemy receiving at later date further
re-inforcements. The Staffs hold therefore that from a purely military pom
of view it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad unless military authorities have
power to withdraw troops at once without regard to political considerations
if military exigencies make this necessary.
The War Office would give the 2 Indian divisions but could not under
any circumstances spare further reinforcements and are doubtful_ ot their
capacity even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe.
They think Baghdad can be easily taken and held for some time, but it might
become untenable later as explained above.
At present moment it seems German attempt to break through to
Constantinople will succeed and our position and prospects in the Gaiiipon
are most uncertain. Persia seems drifting into war on the German side
whilst the Arabs are wavering and will probably join Turks unless we can
offer them great inducement. W r e are therefore in great need or striking
success in the east both to check Persian movement and to wm Arabs.
It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad giving assurances to Arab
leaders that we favour creation of Arab State independent of lurks and
that we shall be prepared to consider future disposition of Baghdad in connec
tion therewith. Is this practicable, Sharif of Mecca will certainly ask for
declaration of our intentions as regards Baghdad if we occupy it. Unless you
consider possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance ail
other considerations seems to us to render it desirable and we are prepared
to order it. ^
This is in reply to your private telegram of the 21st October (Dy. No. o. m
35081 A.)
Record copy to G. S. (M, O. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., G. S. (M. O. 2, M. O. 3).