'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎226r] (450/501)

3
fhe economic; arguments used by the Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. are in complete contradiction of facts.
1 he export trade of Mosul Vilayet finds its outlet to the sea at Basra, or at the
Mediterranean ports of the Arab province of Syria. Some local bartering may take
place with contiguous districts in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. , and there are undoubtedly areas beyond the
old administrative boundary of the Mosul Vilayet which depend economically on Mosul,
a point with which I shall deal later. But beyond a limited import from Diarbekr of
grain and timber, which can find no outlet save by the Tigris, Mosul has no use
for Anatolian products ; her imports being confined to food-stuffs such as tea and coffee,
and tnanfactured goods brought by sea to the ports above mentioned. On the other
hand, (central and Southern Irak are vitally dependent on the products of the northern
area. After the British occupation of Bagdad, when for eighteen months Turkish
forces denied access to the Mosul Vilayet, great difficulty was experienced in feeding a
population which was thus cut off from the northern wheat-producing plains—the
granary of the country. Only by wholesale and very costly importation from India,
coupled with careful rationing, were famine conditions avoided. It was this experience
which impressed on the mind of the population the essential unity of the three
vilayets.
finally, the strategic arguments of the Kemalist delegate were equally baseless.
I he suggestion that the low downs of the Jabal Hamrin form a strategic frontier
is contrary to all expert military opinion. The occupation of Mosul Vilayet by the
Turks could be indicative only of their intention to use it as a base for an aggressive
military policy, and would be a perpetual menace to the Arab State.
(B .)—Turkish Claims to Southern Kurdistan.
3. It is possible that the Kemalist Government, on further consideration of Lord
Curzon’s statement, may have become aware of the weakness of their claim to the
Mosul Vilayet as a whole, and may in the forthcoming discussions fall back in a demand
for the recession of Southern Kurdistan, in which they would include Sulaimani, Arbil
and Kirkuk divisions and the Kurdish kadhas of Sakho, Amadia, Douk and Akrah,
which form the northern fringe of the Mosul division. They would possibly also claim
the kadhas of Tall Afar and Sinjah, to the east, on the ground that the urban population
of Tall Afar village is Turkoman and that the Yazidis of Sinjar are of Kurdish
origin. I venture to set forth the following three principles to which I have given
weight in dealing with a claim of this nature, as well as in framing detailed proposals as
to the demarcation of the frontier : —
( 1 .) A frontier should not cut in half confederations or communities, or cut olf
communities from the centres upon which they depend economically.
(2 ) A frontier line should, if possible, lie in country of such a nature that neither
side is attracted by it, or tempted to live in it, or even to visit it.
( 3 .) Demarcation of a frontier should not involve any drastic change in the
economic or political habits of the inhabitants of the frontier districts.
In the conference at Lausanne, Ismet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. referred to the fact that the treaty
of Sbvres had contemplated the formation of an autonomous Kurdish i^tate \\ ithm
Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. , and had provided that, if this State should prove its desire for independence
from Turkey, no objection would be raised to the adhesion to it of the Kurdish
districts within the Irak. He sought to interpret this fact as an admission on the
part of the Allies that the Irak State would not suffer by the exclusion of Southern
Kurdistan. It is easy to disprove this contention. An autonomous Kurdish State,
owing its existence to the Allies, bound by ties of gratitude to them, and, it may be
presumed, generally amenable to their policy, would have been for the Irak State a
very different and less threatening neighbour than the new lurkey. And to bung
down close to the Irak frontiers the unorganised outskirts of an autonomous and
newly-Hedged Kurdistan would have been far less dangerous than to place the vitals
of Irak within striking distance of a Power like Turkey, smarting from recent defeat
and probably actuated by a desire for the reconquest of her ancient dominions.
Arguments, therefore, which might reasonably be adduced in suppoit of the light
of all Kurdish areas to form part of an independent Kurdistan, are now inapplicable.
The issue must be regarded from a different standpoint, and a decision as to the
propriety of including the Kurdish provinces of Mosul Vilayet within the Irak should
be governed by administrative, economic and strategic considerations, as well as by the
inclinations of the populations concerned.

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎226r] (450/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎226r] (450/501)

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