'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎208r] (413/501)

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J A A (j Ail 1 2i ,
! LEAGUE OF NATIONS
AND
MOSUL PROBLEM.
THE FIRST STEP.
FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.
_ GENEVA, Friday.
The Mosul question will undoubtedly come
before the League next week, but it is not yet
’ certain whether it will be definitely proceeded
with at once or left to a subsequent meeting.
Present indications tend to the latter course.
I Meanwhile, it is important to have a clear
, understanding of the possible developments
under League procedure. The first step is the
"" invitation to Turkey as a non-member of the
League to accept obligations of membership for
l the purposes of the dispute. In view of
Turkey’s promise to apply for membership of
. the League, it would appear difficult for her to
decline this invitation, though the Lausanne
Conference seems so precarious at the present
moment that it is unwise to take anything for
granted. Ir Turkey should decline, an economic
blockade does not immediately follow. What tho
Covenant says is, if a State refuses to accept
obligations of membership for the purposes of
dispute, “ and shall resort to war against
a member of the League,” an economic blockade
shall be applicable against it. Whether resort
to war is a phrase which can be construed as
covering warlike preparations is a matter of
legal interpretation, upon which one is not
competent to speak decisively. The same
phrase occurs in the article which lays down
the conditions of the blockade.
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Supposing Turkey refused temporary mem
bership, it is not absolutely clear what the
League’s course would be; presumably it
would still endeavour to reach conclusions, but
with no obvious authority to impose them
unless Turkey resorted to war. As she could
not obtain Mosul except by resort to war—
assuming Britain’s case is upheld—in practice
it would mean that any attempt on her part
to upset the League’s decision would entail
the consideration of the application of the
blockade.
There is another interesting point regarding
the unanimity of the Council to which the
Marquis Curzon referred at Lausanne ; if the
dispute is settled there the matter ends. If
not, the Council, either unanimously or by a
majority vote, issues a statement and makes
recommendations which it may deem just. If
the Council’s report be unanimously accepted
by members other than the representatives of
any party to the dispute, the members of the
League must not go to war with any party
which complies with the Council’s recommen
dations. If the Council fails to reach unani
mity, excluding the parties tq the dispute, the
members of the League reserve to themselves
the right to take such action as they deem
necessary for the maintenance of right and
justice. On the face of it this seems to imply
that the vote of neither Britain nor Turkev
can upset unanimity, but if one party dissents
all that happens is that the members of the
League agree not to go to war with the other
which assents. If both dissent there again
seems to be no further action for the League
unless either resorts to w r ar, which would ipso
facto be war against the unanimous recom
mendations of the Council. These considerations
merely serve to show that the League is not
a super-State but an organisation to endeavour
to secure an agreed settlement and possessing
punitive sanctions against States which break
rules as defined in the Covenant. If the
Council is unanimous the members of the
League undertake obligations to prevent war.
If not unanimous the whole situation becomes
fluid, with no obvious legal obligations to
prevent war, but unanimity does not comprise
the parties to the dispute. To prevent war is
an obligation in certain definite circumstances,
but to obtain a settlement of the dispute is
another matter.
BRITISH ATTITUDE.
PERILS OF WITHDRAWAL.
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FROM A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT.
The responsibilities of the Cabinet in regard
to Mosul are barely less arduous than its
1
j AJS* (j Ali 1 27,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
AND
MOSUL PROBLEM.
THE FIRST STEP.
FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.
GENEVA, Friday.
The Mosul question will undoubtedly come
before the League next week, but it is not yet
certain whether it will be definitely proceeded
with at once or left to a subsequent meeting.
Present indications tend to the latter course.
Meanwhile, it is important to have a clear
understanding of the possible developments
under League procedure. The first step is the
invitation to Tm'key as a non-member of the
League to accept obligations of membership for
the purposes of the dispute. In view of
Turkey’s promise to apply for membership of
the League, it would appear difficult for her to
decline this invitation, though the Lausanne
Conference seems so precarious at the present
moment that it is unwise to take anything for
granted. Ir Turkey should decline, an economic
blockade does not immediately follow. What tho
Covenant says is, if a State refuses to accept
obligations of membership for the purposes of
dispute, “ and shall resort to war against
a member of the League,” an economic blockade
shall be applicable against it. AVhether resort
to war is a phrase which can be construed as
covering warlike preparations is a matter of
legal interpretation, upon which one is not
competent to speak decisively. The same
phrase occurs in the article which lays down
the conditions of the blockiide.
Supposing Turkey refused temporary mem
bership, it is not absolutely clear what the
League’s course would be; presumably it
would still endeavour to reach conclusions, but
with no obvious authority to impose them
unless Turkey resorted to war. As she could
not obtain Mosul except by resort to war—-
assuming Britain’s case is upheld—in practice
it would mean that any attempt on her part
to upset tho League’s decision would entail
the consideration of the application- of the
blocka/de.
There is another interesting point regarding
the unanimity of the Council to which the
[ Marquis Curzon referred at Lausanne; if the
| dispute is settled there the matter ends. If
' not, the Council, either unanimously or by a
majority vote, issues a statement and makes
recommendations which it may deem just. If
the Council’s report be unanimously accepted
by members other than the representatives of
any party to the dispute, the members of the
League must not go to war with any party
which complies with the Council’s recommen
dations. If the Council fails to reach unani
mity, excluding the parties td the dispute, the
members of the League reserve to themselves
the right to take such action as they deem
necessary for the maintenance of right and
justice. On the face of it this seems to imply
that the vote of neither Britain nor Turkey
can upset unanimity, but if one party dissents
all tbat happens is that the members of the
League agree not to go to war with the other
which assents. If both dissent there again
seems to be no further action for the League
unless either resorts to war, which would ipso
facto be war against the unanimous recom
mendations of the Council. These considerations
! merely serve to show that the League is not
| a super-State but an organisation to endeavour
| to secure an agreed settlement and possessing
j punitive sanctions against States which break
rules as defined in the Covenant. If the
Council is unanimous the members of the
League undertake obligations to prevent war
If not unanimous the whole situation becomes
fluid, with no obvious legal obligations to
prevent war, but unanimity does not comprise
the parties to the dispute. To prevent war is
an obligation in certain definite circumstances,
but to obtain a settlement of the dispute is
another matter.
BRITISH ATTITUDE.
PERILS OF WITHDRAWAL.
FROM A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT
The responsibilities of the Cabinet in regard
to Mosul are barely less arduous than its
t-ac—•' vnaihilj-H es in regard to the Ruhr,
although they might conceivably be lightened
next week by an adequate response on the part
of the League Council to the appeal, of which
the M.arquis Curzon has given notice, for its
potential support in defence of the Irak
mandate entrusted to Great Britain under its
cegis. It will be interesting to see not. only
t how far the Allies are prepared to act, in an
. i emergency, in the spirit of the Covenant and
I to subordinate any individual interests to a
, | common policy and a. common purpose, hut
I what would be the attitude towards such an
emergency of the Neutral Powers, among
which are to be found some of the pillars of
the League. If they should respond, as it
is both hoped and believed that they will
respond, the future of Arab independence,
to say nothing of our civilising mission in the
Middle East, would he assured. For the Turk
would hardly dare to defy the authority of
a united commonwealth like the League. Nor
is it credible that any member State, in order
to escape its share of responsibility, would
behave in so poor a spirit as to invoke the
dubious argument that a general peace never
having as yet been concluded between the
Allies and Turkey, no such call as is proposed
could constitute an obligation for member
States. The policy of the British Government
is clear. That Government could not, in any
case, lay aside its mandatory duties regarding
Irak or any part of Irak territory except by
the invitation or with the sanction of the
League. It is pointed out that with the
surrender of Mosul to Turkey Baghdad would
be at the mercy of the latter, and even Basrah
could not be held without considerable diffi
culty. All the most competent observers are
of opinion that a British withdrawal from
Irak would soon bring about a French with
drawal from Syria, whether under Turkish
military pressure or for reasons of domestic
finance. In such an event, it is held, our posi
tion in Palestine would rapidly become
untenable, and our control of the Suez Canal,
! owing to the new mental and political con
ditions which now obtain in Egypt, would
be, perhaps, less secure than it was in ,1914
Moreover, the recovery by the Turk of his
i former Arab possessions would enhance his
prestige, to say nothing of his material power,
throughout Asia in formidable fashion. There
are also minor considerations—e.g., the
1 interesting fact that the Mosul region and
Northern Irak generally contain some of
the ablest and sturdiest elements in the
country.
i I find that, although the Turkish command
| has undoubtedly been preparing to move im-
] portant bodies of troops, from the Caucasus
1 and elsewhere, towards the Irak-Kurdistan
s : frontier, its plans, according to expert opinion,
1 j are still far from maturity. Turkish propa-
j' ganda, however, is malting the most of what is
3 thought to be a relatively small concentration
J to the north-west of Mosul. But, of course, it
a 1 would be ever an easy matter for the Turks to
e j arm and bribe hands of Kurdish irregulars for
y j raiding purposes,
t- The question of Mosul, however, is but one
>r i aspect of the much vaster and still critical issue
ly i of a general settlement with Turkey. Ismet
st Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. has declared himself bound to submit
, the draft Treaty, not only before ratification,
16 1 but before even signature, to Angora. Not-
i withstanding the favourable and generous
terms which the Allies are prepared to offer,
Sir! the prospects of acceptance by Angora-are not
m ‘ I widely regarded as promising, more especially
if, as Ismet has further declared, he is return
ing to the army, abandoning diplomacy to
politicians like Dr. Riza Nur and, possibly, M.
,dy ; Araloff. Undoubtedly, if the Soviet envoy at
Angora has a considerable following in the
Grand Assembly and the Kemalist Press, he has
also dour opponents. The best type of Turkish
soldier distrusts and dislikes Bolshevism, and
the subservience to Moscow of tho political
extremists, and some of the Turkish mili
tary leaders, although they may not love it,
havea wholesome respectfor theBrttish Empire.
But perhaps the only real “ peace party ” at
this date—or what might be fittingly described
as such—is to bo found among the more en
lightened and sobered members of the older
generation of Young Turks (our friends of the
<■ Entente Liberale ” are mostly in exile), like
Djavid Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and the few, very few, Constan
tinople or Angora politicians who, having a
business sense, are aware of the vital import
ance for the future Turkey of British goodwill.
Neither that of Britain nor that of the civilised
world in general will be assured to Turkey
if she should be so arrogant and foolish as to
flout the League’s authority.
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