'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎54r] (109/501)

a
tragancanth and gall-nuts. Every ounce of the tobacco grown, except the relatively
small quantity needed for local consumption, goes to Bagdad and is consumed in
the Bagdad and Basra Vilayets; the surplus grain of the Mosul Milayet goes to feed
the people of Bagdad, and the timber to build houses in Bagdad. The wool, the
hides and the gum, and the gall-nuts which are an important ingredient in the
manufacture of European ink, go entirely to foreign countries. Etow could Mosul
dispose of grain, wool or hides in Turkey, when Turkey itself is a large producer
of all these products; or of tobacco in a country which has large tobacco producing
areas of its own ? Bagdad is dependent on the Mosul Vilayet for its wheat supplies
to such an extent that during the war, when the two vilayets were separated by
military operations, the British military authorities had to import wheat from
India to feed Bagdad city and district. A striking instance of the manner in which
economic considerations cut across ethnic boundaries is the fact that the Erbil-
Altun Keupru district, which is partly Turkoman as to the towns and mainly
Kurdish as to the agricultural areas, lives almost entirely on supplying Bagdad with
grain. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that if the country north of the existing
boundary between Turkey on one side, and Syria and Irak on the other, ceased to
exist, the economic life of the Mosul Vilayet would hardly be disturbed at all. Irak,
as it is, can do without Turkey, but Mosul is indispensable to Bagdad.
5. Strategic.
It is further urged by the Turkish delegation that the southern boundary of
the vilayet of Mosul, which runs along the Jabal Hamrin in a south-easterly
direction as far as the River Diyalah, and then along the Diyalah as far as the
Persian frontier, w T ould constitute an excellent strategical frontier between Turkey
and Irak. This contention cannot be accepted for one moment. The adoption of
the Jabal Hamrin-Diyalah line would in fact make the position of the Irak State
untenable. In the first place, the Power occupying Mosul need only hold up the
export of grain from that place to cut off the capital of Irak from its main source
of wheat supply. Secondly, a day’s easy march would enable any such Power to
cut the sole road between Irak and Persia, a road which is vital to the economic life
of Bagdad and Basra, whose people live very largely on the Persian trade.
Thirdly, the position of an Arab Government in Bagdad, which is some 560 miles
by river from the southern limit of the Irak State, would be quite impossible if the
frontier of a possibly unfriendly State were only 70 miles distant. Lastly, there
appears to be no particular reason why the Arab State of Irak or Great Britain
as the Mandatory Power, should hand over to the Turkish Government a place
where it might think fit to maintain an army corps as a menace to the surrounding
regions.
6. The 'National Pact.
Lastly it has more than once been stated by the Turkish delegation that their
claim for the recovery of the Mosul V ilayet, or at any rate of Mosul town, is supported
by the first article of the National Pact, passed by the Turkish Chamber of Deputies
on the 17th February, 1920. It can easily be shown that this is not the case. The
article reads as follows :—
‘ ‘ Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the
Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and
which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th October, 1918, were in the
occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes
which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether
within or outside the said airmistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman
Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with senti
ments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful
of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a
whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance."
In the first place it is both a novel and a startling pretension that a Power which
has been vanquished in war should dictate to the victors the manner in which they
are to dispose of the territories which they have wrested from the former. It would
be interesting to know if a single instance can be found in history in which the
Turks having conquered any territory by force of arms have ever encouraged the
vanquished to demand a plebiscite in the area in question oi have expiessed a
willingness to abide by the result of such a vote.

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎54r] (109/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎54r] (109/501)

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