'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎19v] (38/501)

2
of the existing garrison of Iraq should be able to defeat, if the forward policy was
adopted. This policy, as shown above, will enable us to strike at the enemy s own
bases; and it will avoid an initial withdrawal from Mosul and abandonment of
Kurdistan, which would undoubtedly convert even an intrinsically weak enemy
attack into a formidable movement.
The Air Staff have already indicated (C.P. 4309) that, in their view, with
drawal from Mosul, consequent on a breach with Turkey and followed by the Turkish
occupation of the district, with all that it would imply, militarily and politically,
would render reinforcements for Baghdad and the lines of communication south of
Baghdad essential to guard against internal risings.
In view of the possibility of a weak attack developing into a strong attack,
referred to in (b) below, some reinforcements should be designated to arrive in the
country at the earliest possible moment.
(b.) A Turkish attack may be made on a scale which the existing garrison could
not hope to meet without reinforcements. The Air Staff are of opinion that in this
case reinforcements will be necessary (1) whether we stand at Mosul or (2) at Baghdad
or (3) to enable us to withdraw to Basra : also that those reinforcements should reach
Iraq before the invasion develops. The strength required in the above cases is being
discussed with the Air Officer Commanding.*
A forward policy again offers the greater prospect of success, in that the danger
of internal rising being added to external invasion will be greatly reduced by its
adoption. It should be added that, from the Turkish point of view, an invasion in
force would be a serious undertaking, of which we could rely on receiving ample
warning and which could not, it is believed, eventuate before the spring.
4. To sum up : —
(a.) The Air Staff are of opinion that, in the event of attack by the Turks, rein
forcements will be necessary whether we adopt a forward policy or whether we decide
to evacuate.
(b.) The Air Staff recommend that, in the event of the Lausanne Conference
resulting in a definite rupture with the Turks, and of any consequent threat of
invasion in the north of Iraq, the Air Officer Commanding should be authorised to
adopt the forward policy. Since, in the contingency of the vigorous action of the
air forces failing to stop an invasion in force, it is assumed that it is not the policy
of His Majesty’s Government to provide reinforcements adequate to fight to a finish
for the integrity of the present boundaries of Iraq, the Air Officer Commanding
should be instructed to limit the ground forces in the forward area to such as are
required to cover the air operations.
(c.) As immediate measures, (i) the Air Officer Commanding should be notified
in this sense, and instructed to make his disposition accordingly, but not to move
troops for the purpose without further authority from His Majesty’s Government.
(ii.) The High Commissioner and Air Officer Commanding should receive
sanction for any reasonable proposals they may put forward for the improvement of
the general internal situation by enlisting the aid of the tribes as a counter-move to
prevent Turkish propaganda and infiltration, and should be empowered to make the
necessary preliminary arrangements, subject to political considerations, to explore
the measure of assistance which might be obtained from the tribes to meet a Turkish
invasion.
5. The Air Staff confine themselves to the hypothesis of a definite breakdown of
the Lausanne Conference, as it is to meet that contingency that a clear indication of
policy is needed for the guidance of the Air Officer Commanding. If, on the other
hand, the Lausanne Conference ends either in an agreement with Turkey or comes to
no conclusions either way, the position should be again reviewed.
This paper has been drawn up in general agreement with the General Staff ai
the War Office. A supplementary note on the subject of reinforcements will be
submitted if required by the Cabinet.
Air Staff, December 4, 1922.
* The scale of the garrison of Iraq has never comprised provision for guarding the country against
serious external invasion ; and we could not contemplate a retirement of our existing garrison lighting
rearguard actions from Mosul to Basra in face of a Turkish attack in strength. General Townsend fought
a successful battle at Ctesiphon with 14,000 troops against 13,000 regulars, but having to retire was
beleaguered within 8 days in Kut, some 100 miles south.

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎19v] (38/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎19v] (38/501)

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