'ARBITRATION CONCERNING BURAIMI AND THE COMMON FRONTIER BETWEEN ABU DHABI AND SA'ŪDI ARABIA' [With maps] [‎72r] (148/541)

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with Abu Dhabi and other Arab States in Eastern Arabia' 1 2 * 4 '. These lines incor
porated in Sa‘udi Arabia large areas to the east of the Blue Line, includine Darts
of Qatar and a small enclave of Abu Dhabi territory at the Khaur al-‘Udaid and
Khaur al-Dhuwaihin. It may, therefore, be argued that, according to the rule
applied in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case' the present dispute crystallized with
the presentation of the Sa‘udi Government’s claim on April 3, 1935. If the dispute
did not crystallize at that moment, then it clearly did so, some eight months later
when the British offer of the Riyadh Line was rejected by the Sa‘udi Government^’
This line was offered to the Sa‘udi Government on November 25, 1935, as a com
promise, and as representing the further possible limit of the British Government’s
concessions, but was rejected by King Ibn Sa‘ud on the following day.
60. The legal effect of the crystallization of the dispute, in 1935, has been
discussed in Part VIII Section B. Under the jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice, any subsequent acts of the parties, done for the purpose of
improving their legal positions in the present dispute, are to be excluded from
consideration as evidence of their sovereignty. The Riyadh Line having been
offered as the furthest possible limit of concession by the British Government, it
follows that any Sa’udi activities east of the Riyadh Line after 1935 must be
presumed to be activities undertaken by the Sa‘udi Government for the improve
ment of its legal position and excluded from the Tribunal’s consideration, together
with any new situations resulting from them.
The Legal Situation at the Beginning of 1949
61. The Government of the United Kingdom contends that nothing that
occurred between 1915 and 1949 changed the legal positions of the three Rulers
in any way, and that their respective legal rights and titles were precisely the same
as they had been in 1915. In other words:—
(a) In the area which is the subject of Article II(c/) of the Arbitration Agree
ment, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi possessed a valid and subsisting title
to the sovereignty, by continuous and peaceful display of authority
since time immemorial;
(b) In the Buraimi Zone, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat
and ‘Oman possessed valid and subsisting titles to the sovereignty of
their respective parts of the Zone, by continuous and peaceful display
of authority ever since the final eviction of the Wahhabi aggressors
in 1869;
(c) King Ibn Sa‘ud, as against the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of
Muscat and ‘Oman, possessed no rights to the sovereignty of either of
the areas which are the subject of the present Arbitration, and was
himself bound in law to respect the Blue Line.
The only material changes in the general legal situation were (i) King Ibn Sa‘ud
had formulated definite pretensions to areas east of the Blue Line and (ii) the
British Government, without waiving its rights under the Anglo-Turkish Conven
tion of 1914, had intimated its willingness, for the sake of a settlement, to agree
to the Sa‘udi Arabian boundary being advanced from the Blue Line to the Riyadh
Line, that is, approximately to the eastern edge of the Jafurah desert.
62. As to the new pretensions of the Sa‘udi Government, during the pro
longed discussions which took place between 1934 and 1938 concerning the Sa udi
Arabian—Abu Dhabi boundary, the Sa‘udi Government had not ventured to
claim any of the coast to the east of the Khaur al-Dhuwaihin. Nor had it claimed,
Liwa or any other part of the hinterland between the coast and the Rub al-Khah
and least of all had it made a claim to Buraimi. On the contrary, it had formulated
its 1935 claim <4) , saying expressly that the frontiers had been “ defined after the
most careful investigation of the actual facts ”, and yet these frontiers left all the
coast to the east of the Khaur al-Dhuwaihin and Liwa and the remainder ol the
hinterland, and, of course, Buraimi outside Sa‘udi Arabia.
63. As to the British Government’s attitude, it had intimated its willingness
to waive its right to the maintenance of the Blue Line, because the Rulers ot Abu
(1) i.e., the Red Lines on Map B.
(2) See Part IX, paragraphs 4 and 6, of this Memorial. . u i
<3) For the Riyadh Line, see Part VIII paragraph 31 and the broken Red Line on Map B ot Volume
(4) See the Red Lines on Map B.