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'Situation in Persia, Vol. I' [‎118r] (237/353)

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'Situation in Persia, Vol. I'
353 images
Ref: IOR/L/MIL/5/803, ff 1-174

The record is made up of 1 item (174 folios). It was created in 20 Sep 1917-19 Mar 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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3
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
If so we are ready to place at their disposal a number of armoured motor
cars with British personnel, which could, m our opinion, be usefu y
employed in patrolling the Kenn,-u,shah-1 laniadan-Enzel. road In return
for P their acceptance of our assistance, and for the establishment of an effective
cordon between the Caspian and the right flank of our position m Mesopo
tamia, we should he ready to withdraw all our regular troops (othei Inin
Consular guards) from the interior of Persia. 1 he question of attaching
British officers to the Persian Cossack Brigade might he raised in the same
connection. Sir C. Marling, it is true, has stated that such a proposal won d
never be entertained by the Persian Government. But until it has actually
been put to them it seems premature to abandon the suggestion in advance,
or to assume that there is no hope of its acceptance if urged tactfully upon
the Persian Government as part of a scheme of traiiquidisation framed m a
large measure in the interests of Persia itself. If further inducements are
needed they might take the familiar form of increased financial assistance.
8 In conclusion, it should be clearly understood that the measures in
contemplation do not include anything in the nature of elaborate mi htary
operations in North-West Persia. Apart altogether from political objections,
it is recognised that the troops required for such a purpose are not available.
WhaWs suggested is that a lieet of armoured motor-cars under ^charge
of British officers aud non-commissioned officers «f Gcnnnl^ Thiustmi-
f,-om -lGmr i SlA-in-nlong thcd^HU,m.diah road, Trrth-goncn,U
- p at rol ef q.-mom-cd —motet curs, under the charge- ol ail ^ 1 . n ,° n 1
jnnrl nffi 1 General Dunsterville’s party, should be established
at soutlierii end of the Kasr-i-Shirin-Kermanshah-l amadau road and
should graduailv extend its operations northwards in the direction of the
"wspia/as circumstances permit. The British officers in charge would have
authority to organise local levies, &c„ as opportunity offered or to take ovei
existing organisations (e.g., the Cossack Brigade) to assjst them in the
woldt. “it is believed that,'given the right quality of officer and he necessary
v 1 i cnivnm’t flip objects in view could be achieved without fuitncr
Swe Zm ’ regular troops. Tlie General Officer Commanding
Mesopotamia, would not be. required to do more than extenu ^gbt flank
,m to the eastern end of the passes loading from Iiak nto ieisia. inese
passes^ it may lie observed, will be clear of snow and open to traffic in
about a month s time.

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Content

This item contains material relating to a review of conditions in Persia [Iran], following the revelation of Turkish plans to invade Persia in order to reach Afghanistan, which would in turn have threatened the British Empire in India. It includes:

  • The policies to secure the cooperation of the Persian Government, as well as Isma’il Khan Qashqa’i Sawlat al-Dawlah, Ibrahim Khan Qavam al-Mulk Shirazi, and ‘Abd al-Husayn Mirza Farmanfarma
  • The proposals to secure the recognition of the South Persia Rifles by the Persian Government
  • The receipt and dissemination of intelligence about Persia relayed to Britain and India
  • The maintenance of communications with the Caucasus through the Kermanshah-Enzeli [Anzali] Road
  • The capture of Prince Sulayman Mirza Iskandari of the Firqah-yi Democrat [Democratic Party]
  • The prevention of Ottoman and German intelligence operatives from crossing into western Persia
  • The resignation of the Commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, Colonel Georgii Josifovich Klerzhe
  • A message from Mirza Kuchak Khan's Jangali Movement that the passage of British officers led by General Lionel Dunsterville through Persia to Tiflis [Tblisi] would be 'contrary to the independence of Persia, [and] they will consider themselves justified in taking any measures to frustrate it'
  • The protection of the Kermanshah-Hamadan and Shiraz-Isfahan roads and the British Legation in Tehran
  • The circulation of anti-British Jangali telegrams condemning the arrest of Sulayman Mirza Iskandari
  • The threat of a combined force of Jangalis and Bolsheviks reportedly marching on Kasvin [Qazvin]
  • The provision of support to General Dunsterville through seizing the Qasr-i Shirin-Kermanshah Road
  • The discussion of 'sweep operations' between Mirza Kuchak Khan and the Anzali Bolshevik Committee
  • The consultations between Commander-in-Chief, India and the head of the South Persia Rifles, Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes
  • The plans for controlling the road extending from the Ottoman frontier to Northeast Persia
  • The zone of operations allocated to the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Mesopotamia, General William Raine Marshall, and his relations with the British Minister at Tehran, Charles Marling
  • The position and action to be taken by General Dunsterville after General Marshall's operations
  • And the proposal of Sykes (relayed by Commander-in-Chief, India General Charles Carmichael Monro) for Indian troops to advance to Isfahan, where they were to form an additional brigade of the South Persia Rifles.

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1 item (174 folios)
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English in Latin script
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'Situation in Persia, Vol. I' [‎118r] (237/353), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/5/803, ff 1-174, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100118971946.0x000026> [accessed 6 April 2025]

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Reference
IOR/L/MIL/5/803, ff 1-174
Title
'Situation in Persia, Vol. I'
Pages
front, front-i, 2r:8v, 9ar, 9r:117v, 118ar, 118r:134v, 135ar, 135r, 135av, 135v:173v, 174ar, 174r:174v
Author
East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
Usage terms
Open Government Licence