'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎564v] (1140/1386)

1G
No. 52.
Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy,
dated 2Sth F ebruary 1910.
Private. My private telegram of 23rd February. Offer of Joint War Committee,
feir A. Lawley regrets that unforeseen circumstances have now arisen which wifi
prevent him from going to Mesopotamia himself.
Joint \\ ar Committee agree that it is unnecessary to send representative to
Mesopotamia from this country in view of fact that Indian Council already have a
representative there ; they are arranging details of assistance to be rendered with
Indian Council direct. :
No. 53.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India,
dated 2Sth February 1910.
Private. Your private telegram of the 23rd instant. Sir A. Lawley s proposal
gladly and gratetully accepted. • 1
No. 51.
: \-
Telegram from Seeretari! of State for India to Viceroy,
dated 2q£J February 1916.
I in ate. 5our private telegram of 25th Februarv. Medical arrangements in
Mesopotamia. I am very glad to hear of steps taken by you and Commander-in-
Unef. Are you satisfied with health of troops at Aden? Disquietino- reports
reach me. - W ° 1
No. 55.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India,
dated 2nd March 1916.
1 rivate. M} private telegram of doth February. Medical treatment in Meso-
potaima Following is text of private telegram from Sir Percy Lake to Commander-
m-Lhief, which explains the whole situation, which I have the latter’s permission to
transmit, and which you should see.
“ from what I have heard since my arrival, I fear there must be foundation for
some of stories regarding sufferings of wounded. Personally, I should welcome the
aunal of an impartial commission which could record facts such as that Townshend
was appealing for prompt relief, and that there was reason to expect that the Turks
would be reinforced by two fresh divisions by 20th January. That after careful
jomt consideration of situation by my predecessor and General Aylmer, it was
decided that this advance ought to commence on 3rd January and be completed if
possible by. 15th January. Jhat Aylmer therefore had no choice but to push on
without waiting to complete his orgnisation, which was defective in many other
respects as well as m medical equipment and personnel. Moreover, available river
transport was insufficient to meet three main requirements of his force, namely
fii st, its maintenance m food and ammunition ; secondly, transport of reinforcements
to join him ; and thirdly, the proper provision for treatment and transport of his
wounded.
! he number of probable casualties was no doubt under-estimated, but had it not
been tor the atrocious weather I believe that, not only would his casualties have been
far fewer, but the difficulties experienced in dealing with wounded and their suffering
would 1m e been lai less acute, wdiile he would probably have succeeded in his task
Alter my visit to front just after my arrival, I sent General Hathaway to look into the
whole'question of medical arrangements, affit satisfy himself as to their completeness
before our .next movement forward. On his return he assured me that no such
failuie of me'dicai treatment was likely to recur on Aylmer’s next advance. For
example, on previous occasion, the field ambulances of third and seventh divisions
had not ailived m the country, while all those which had originally been in the
advance on Ctesiphon were shut up in Kut; it was only possible to improvise eiffiit
sections for whole of force. " &
“ Aylmer Las now 15 field ambulances complete except that it has not hitherto
been possible to send up ambulance wagons and motor ambulances ovdng to shortao-e