'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎559r] (1128/1386)

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theatres, i hose instliiclions \viJl,*df course, l>e based on the decisions of
the War Ct>nimitlee.
(-) fndia wilt nunain, as at present, the main base of the force in Mesopotamia,
which will continue to be administered by the Conunandei-in-Chief in
India, such requirements of the force as India cannot meet being supplied
by the \\ ar Ottice from other parts of the Empire, subject to the general
policy, at the time being, decided upon by the War Committee.
(3) r I he General OHicer ('ominanding in Mesopotamia will send all reports of
operations, states, returns, recommendations as to the higher appoint*
men t r and requests lor additional rmits^to the Commander-in-Chief in
India, and will repeat these to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
( I) Demands for drafts to maintain Indian units now in Mesopotamia and for such
war material as is being provided from India will, as at present, be made
on the Commander-in-Chief, India.
(•)) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the ^ommander-in-Chief, India,
will, as required, correspond direct in regard to the requirements of the
force in Mesopotamia, but all questions of principle or policy likely to
affect the military or-infernal security of India will continue to be referred
by the Coinmander-in Chief in India to the Viceroy.
(0) Copies of all telegrams exchanged with India will be supplied by the General
Staff to the Secretary qf State for India.
(7) Arrangements in regard to prisoners of war, our sick and wounded, and as to
the finance of the campaign will remain as at present.
(S) All press communiques will be issued through the War Office after com
munication with the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and telegraphed to the Commander-in-
Chief, India.
(9; Intelligence obtained in India which might affect the operations will be
communicated by wire to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and
repeated to the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia.
(10) The foregoing provisions are to make no change in the control of the troops
in India as at present exercised.
Subject to any observations you have to oiler, War Committee of Cabinet propose
to approve these arrangements. Chief of Imperial General Staff recognises that they
can only work effectively if whole-hea/.edly accepted by the Government of India,
but with good-will on both sides,central control over all the forces of the Empire in
the Field will lead both to greater efficiency ami economy of force, as shown by the
example of our enemy. The cause of the entente has suffered greatly from the want
of co-ordinated action and the lack of co-ordination is increased by the existing
system under which the Mesopotamian campaign is outside the contrtrl of the Imperial
General Staff.
I would add that I personally welcome, these proposals, being convinced that they
will lead to more efficient co-operation and bettor support from home. India cannot
spare more troops, and you and I have therefore no reserves at our disposal, whilst
for all military suppliesT am practically dependent on supplies from War Office. At
present responsibility and power are divided. By these proposals they will, be united
in General Stall subjected to Cabinet control.
Telenrlim from Viceroy to Secretory of State for India,
10th February 1916.
dated
Private. Your private telegram of the 3rd instant. Control of military operations
in Mesopotamia. I have consulted Commander-in-Chief and we wish to assure you
that we wholeheartedly accept new arrangement and will carry it out wdth all
goodwill and in no grudging spirit.
There are one or two points which require elucidation and possibly amendment.
For instance, it is not clear which authority is to make higher appointments
referred to in Section 3.
Section 5 applies only to India, but I think it is very desirable that, apart from
Mesopotamia, the political control of the Viceroy in Persia and the Gulfs ho hid not be
weakened. . .. . . ~ .