'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎421v] (853/1386)

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" Paraaranh 4—As regards Karim I am well alive to possibility ot a hostile
movement in that direction, and it was with this eventuality in view that 1 have
already asked lor and will require two more Divisions, ihe Secretary of u tate
presume grasps fact that it takes nearly two months to transfer a force, like a
Division from one (? situation to) another under conditions as they exist here.
The above telegram seems to indicate that white Nixon is empliatic that relief of
Townshend is his first objective yet apprehension for the sa ety ot liis detachment at
Nasirivah lest a Turkish advance down Euphrates should overwhelm that detach
ment and then threaten Basrah is his reasenfor his action m diverting reinforcements
from Tigris. Nixon must be best judge of disposition necessitates by local
information, but so far as lie has reported to us there is no sign ot any stiong
Turkish movement down Euphrates. With regard to fcliat-el-1 iai so long as we ho d
Kut it is not clear how the Turks can use the Shat-el- hu as line ol appioach to
Basraii and we inucli doubt if reinforcement of Nasiriyah will deceive enemy as to
real direction of .Nison’s concentration. . .
As regards Karim line so long as we are strong on the 1 igns above Amaia wo
thereby secure oil fields and impress Bakhtiari with sense of our military superiority
and it was understood that when Nixon asked for Otli and < th Divisions, vide his
telegram 1008/108/0, dated 14th December, he realised that the strongest argument
to support his request was the probability of lurks in the Daghdad region Hang
increased to 00,000 men and the vital necessity of his being able to maintain
bis position above Amara in the face of that force.
It i s this probability which might justify War Council m despatching two more
Divisions from the main theatre of war.
No. 28.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of Stale for lndia,
dated 2bth December 1015.
11 10 053. Owing to large increase in size of Force " D,” it has been found
necessary'to augment staff ol that Force. It is, therefore, proposed to have a modified
General Headquarters and in addition an Army Corps Stall. Details of these will
be included in “Orders for the Organisation ot Force (Indian Expeditionary
Force “ D,”) for Operations oversea ” a revised edition ol which is now in course ot
preparation'. No Divisional statements wall be required for 34th, 35th and 3C>th
Infantry Brigades as it has been arranged with Nixon that these Brigades will bo
attached to existing Divisions.
No. 29,
Telegram from Secretary of State for India to I iceroy,
dated 20tk December 1915. i
3287. Reference your telegram of 18th instant No. If. 9883. War Office will
despatch to India 12 additional garrison battalions, beginning next week, to enable
you to complete and maintain the 5th Division for lorce “D.”
War Committee taking note of this decision recommend that, instructions be sent
to Nixon in the following sense
1 . Under existing conditions no hope can be held out that two additional divisions
can be spared. # ,
2 Alter relieving Townshend, Nixon’s policy should be to act on defensive.
3 Defensive positions should at once bo prepared about Kurna and in the Shaiba
area, in case withdrawal from Kut should become necessary.
Nixon will be in the best position to decide wliether Kut, should be held after
Townshend’s relief or whether withdrawal to Amara or Kurna is desirable in the
circumstances.
No, 30.
Telegram from Secretary of State for India to 1 teeroy,
dated 29/)/ December 1915.
Private. Reference my Military telegram 3237 of to-day and to make position
clear to vourself and Duff.
General military position was reviewed by W ar Committee yesterday and following
conclusions were adopted on advice of General Stab, subject to revision if circum
stances change materially ;—