'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎413v] (837/1386)

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apparently the Turks are transfer; iu./ troops to die Eupbra-ks. It would be a didiculi. task to
smash their advanced troops since their G-erman advisers are not likely to allow the Turks to
mafcie the mistake of coming within striking distance oi I^asra until they have concentrated
their forces. They could then advance on a wide front subject to suitable arrangements for
supplying their right wing, which would be in the desert, which could probably be made.
Barrett has at present 14,400 men and 40 guns including his detachment at Ah wan and would
stand little chance at Basra if widely outflanked.
* Ah regards our resources we are as you say to receive three battalions from China though
the date of arrival of doth Sikhs seem ; \cry doubtful. Even so we shall be better off bv t >vo
battalions oidy .since we have had to send the 18th Infantry to China to replace one of them.
Assuming that we send Barrett another Brigade as you suggest this would give him 17,400
men only. Our position in India is deteriorating internally and trouble on the Frontier in the
spring is probable enough and must be provided for.
‘ Takiner Maskat and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. toe-ether we can draw nothing from there. The
102nd are so inefficient from fever that we must withdraw and replace them. The doth must
lake up all the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. detachments which in the present position of affairs cannot lie
reduced mid may have to be strengthened. Mussulman troops art; in the main averse from
lighting Turks and cannot be sent freely to Barrett while we cannot be sure wliat thcir
attitude would be if called on to tight Mussulmans on the Frontier when a Jehad was being
preached. It is therefore difficult to spare Hindus of any class. It seems tons that those
who are directing the strategy of the Empire should give the situation in Mesopotamia their most
careful consideration. A defeat there' would be disastrous to our position in Asia and withdrawal
from that country which might be only alternative would be little better. While we fullv
recognise the great issues in Europe we cannot (?) in East Africa as in any way vital compared
to those in Mesopotamia. Such information as reaches us from East Africa seems to show that
there is no serious threat to British East Africa. The withdrawal of one brigade of good
troops from East Africa still leaves seven battalions there, most of them, it is true, of inferior
quality, but still capable of being useful on the defensive. A certain amount of pressure
from the Belgian Congo seems to be contemplated, and with the rainv season about to
commence there seems no chance of serious operations against Colony for some time to come.
In these circumstances we would press urgently that the Loyal Nobtb Lancashire Regiment,
29th Punjabis, 2nd Kashmir Rifles, and l oth Rajputs should be sent to Mesopotamia with‘the
least possible delay. This would leave Wapshare the 98th. 101st, 180th Baluchis, 61st,'fiord,
drd Kashmir Rifles, and the Gwalior. ,1 hind, Bharatpur, Kapurthala and Rampur Infantry,
besides his local white volunteers, the King's African Rifles, his other local troops, the
contingent from Rhodesia and the Corps of Frontiersmen of which we have heard. We have
ventured to make these suggestions in view of refusal of our proposal that Indian troops now
m Lg,\ pt should be returned for the service and the protection ol Indian interests in
Mesopotamia and at Aden. Our military resources in India have now been reduced to
bed-rock, and we are only able to reinforce Barrett with such items as two battalions which
will be replaced by two battalions from China, the 7th Hariana Lancers and a second heavy
battery nowon their way to Basra, one battery Territoiial Artillery, and possibly a battalion
of Kabha Imperial Infantry. We share your view that it is imperative that Barrett's forces
should be increased to two divisions, 'i on are no doubt aware that since the outbreak of war
we have sent overseas six divisions of infantry and nearly' three divisions of cavalry, w hile in
return for od battalions of British infantry we have received 85 battalions of ’Territorial
infantn of mixed value. India has, therefore, done her dutv to the Empire, and it is (|itit<'
impossible, in view of situation on the Frontier and in interior, to do more. It is of no use to
sngges’t, to us that we should take further risks in India, We have heavy responsibilities
towards’ European and native popnlalion that cannot be lightly set aside. Our conclusion,
therefore^ is that though we are at one with you in thinking that Barrett’s force should be
increased to at least two divisions, we are unable, in consequence of our generosity towards
His Majesty's Government in the early stages of the war. to find the necessary troops to
compete I hem, and that responsibility rests with 11 is Majesty's Government not merely to
find the necessary additional troops, but for any consequences that may arise due to their
lefnsal to allow India the use oi her own troops to protect her own interests.
No. 101 A Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated ith March 1915.
(Telegra phic).
) our telegram of .ml March together with Barrett's telegram of 4th instant regarding
affair near Ahwaz has been fully considered to-day by the Cabinet, who have decided ’that as
you find a difficulty in forming a normal mixed Brigade, von should despatch as soon as
possible.a Brigade of Territorials. The numerical deficiency thus caused in India will be
ieplaced as soon as possible either from Egypt or East Africa, in accordance with the military
situation. I hope the Dardanelles operations will shortly relieve the political tension and
enable us to give greater consideration to India,
No. 104 A Secretary of State for Lidia to Viceroy, dated Sth March, 1915.
Private. Reinforcements for Mesopotamia. His Majesty's Government appreciate the
prompt manner m winch you are endeavouring to meet the need of the moment.
Secretary of S'a/efor India to Viceroy, dated 21s( April, 1915.
No. 116 A
Private.' Yeomanry regiment. I find that the War Office have become greatly adverse to
sending one o India since it appears that most of this arm will be needed in connection with
tin new ammes. I greatly dislike the appearance of breaking faith with you on a matter
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