'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎400r] (809/1386)

A
Minute by the Military Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , on the
Indian Military Administration.
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Hecent events in Mesopotamia and India have made it apparent that
tmder the present Military organization in India the Commander-in-Chief is >
so overburdened with administrative details and so tied to his that it
is impossible for him to exercise the executive functions of his high office,
and it is obvious that his personal influence must sutler if he is out of close
personal touch with the Army. Since the Army Commands have been in
abeyance the duties of discipline and training and inspection which were
placed/on the two Army Conmianders lin theory) have devolved to a large
extent in practice on the Commander-in-Chief and therefore it is essential
that the Commander-in-Chief should make himself personally acquainted
with the progress of the Army in training for war. To do this, absence
frotn Army Headquarters will necessarily be frequent, and in his absence
some system by which his administrative duties can be supervised and
coordinated seems desirable.
The a have criticism which is now generally recognised as a just one is not
directed against the Commander-in-Chief, but against the system which he
has infc^^ted. It will be in the recoiled ion of the War Committee that in
1906 the old Military Department of the (lovernment of India, together with
the Military Member of Council, was swept away, and replaced by an abortive
organisation styled the Military Si^tply Department. The immediate result
was not so disastrous as it might have bean as..iher4‘ still existed three Army
Commands administered'by Lieutenant-Generals with a/complete Adminis
trative Stall as well as the usual executive or combatant staff. So that
much of the detail work of the administrative services was still decentralised
and specifically allocated to Commands.
Up to June' 1907, Army Head-quart,ers^Sinda, was thus practically
relieved of most details connected with supply, and also many of the
functions that now devolve on the Adjiyflant-General or the Quartermaster-
Ocneral. For example, the Bombay Command would have been responsible
for most of the business connected with despatch of troops from Bombay,
and the Principal Medical Officer of the Command would have been
personally responsible for the preparation of hospitals, for the reception of
sick and wounded at Bombay and elsewhere in that Command. Similarly
in f 1897, during the Tirah campaign, most of the supply and medical
arrangements were controlled by the Punjab Command, thus relieving the
Conmumder-in-Chief and Army Headquarters of much petty, though
burdensome, business. Further, under the old Command system there was
th e .great advantage of personal supervision.
^"~T he Army Commander would dTHThtlessTin such a case as the present
campaign, have frequently gone to Bombay from his headquarters at Poona^
to inspect hospitals and troopships, to see troops depart, and to welcome the
return of the wounded. From his intimate knowledge of local conditions
aiid of the local staffs he would have been able to keep the Commander-in-
Chiei personally informed of the state of affairs, while his persoii^l relations
with the Governor and the Civil Staff of Bombay would have been invaluable
in securing the co-operation of the civil elements with the military. All
this personal touch is lost by the present one-man system. There is nothing
between the Brigadier at Bombay and the Quartermaster-General or
Adjutant-General, as the case may be, at Simla.
I might give many other instances but 1 really think it is hardly worth
while labouring the point.
Although a root and branch reorganisation of the Indian 'system is not
•within the bom/ds of practical politics whilst we are et 11 engaged in war,
the Secretary of State is of opinion that it is of vital importance to take
MS 254 3 — 7/19 '
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