'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎382r] (773/1386)

n
O
ofmi’r 1 movemen r ts"]n J d UStir ! <!d ^ eV ® ntS ’, ' vlli,e tl,e s ecrecy and suddenness
movements had not only ensured success, but had done so at the
Cel th f,aT l’ °f C0 S V° h "' se , ive3 - 011 the 5th -ar ,vas declared' and on
defenders ( f ife 01 ^] 1 , 0 , ’ "f d , escende< J 011 tlle astonished and ill-prepared
ten lei.-; ot the bhatt-el-Arab. Jn less than three weeks a
adnnnistratnm had been established at Basra, the key of Mesopotamia
■it leasf dVu " i| K t' t! l '“‘ events wiiidi led up to the occupation of Basra,
a t ■;« t f the objects we had in vieu- were rapidly and fulK-
State did mt 4 ' ("'tY b f UI 'S 0C ; that even complete success at this initial
‘, % ot Jllstlf > tl ] e despatch of the Expedition, as by it we were onlv
c.)nsidpr°tr *! ul ™ so " rc( : s in a subsidiary issue, it is important to
muW MhA ! P tren ^ of eveilts no such enterprise had been
• t np i'l ]ll ^ iat ? ase ^ 18 certam that Arabia would have abandoned
< j hope ot liberation from lurkish rule and perforce have joined the Turks.
I ho proclamation of jehad would have been endorsed by the Sherif of
i ecca ancE the standard of Islam would have been raised against us-
tluoughout the East, lersia would have followed suit and Turko-German
mtngucs m that country would have met with immediate and popular
1 espouse. A wave of fanaticism would have quickly engulfed Afghanistan,,
am on the Indian frontier the movement would have been hailed with
ml 1 he eager entnusiasm that prospects of easy “ loot ” inspire in barbaric
buc 1 a development would have meant war on a prodigious scale all
a ong the Indian frontier as well as a dangerous internal situation within
India, instead of continuing to send important forces to Europe, Egypt
East Africa and tae Colonies, we might have been compelled to recall some
ol our troops and even to demand assistance from home. Our military
resources would have been gravely strained at a most critical period. The
menace to Egypt,, aiso, would have been immeasurablv more serious than it
u dually was as all Islam from the Nile to the Sahara would have been
< lee ply stirred by the participation of Arabia in the war. Incidentally, of
course, we should have lost our extremely valuable stake in the Oil Fields
while British interests, both commercial and political, would have been
obliterated from the whole of the Middle East. The much-abused Meso
potamian venture at least saved us from all these untoward results during
perhaps the most critical period of the war. In that simple fact lies the
complete justilication of the expedition.
II.—10% we went on to Kuvna and the Kanin Valley.
The capture of Basra was quickly followed by that of Kurna. The
reason for this move is clearly explained in a Military Department Minute of
the 2 1 th ^November 1911, of which the following is an extract:—
The object of going to Kurna is to secure a strong strategical point and a dominating
position. It yvid be seen from the map that Kurna is at the junction of the old channel of the
Euphrates .and 'Tigris, and that it covers and controls all the rich cultivated land along the
Shatt. W hen we leave Kurna we enter the arid countrv which lies between it and Amaru
I he military position is extraordinarily strong, for both flanks are practically unassailable.
( hi the right there are the marshes of the Klior Havvaize which trend right away to the
Persian frontier, while on the left there is the Euphrates.
‘ The advantages of this position are:—
“ (1) Its commanding military value.
(-.) The control it gives us of the whole navigable waterway to t he Gulf.
‘‘ (A) Tj ie possession of tin whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the sea.
(1) J he Lu i that it complete!} covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it from
'Turkish intrigues or incursions.
“ (o) The moral effect on the Arabs.
‘‘ <A) rj l| e control of the telegraph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates.
£ ’ ^Yicn we have reached Kurna and fully established ourselves there it will be time
on !Hgh to consider whether we should go further.”
Lord Crewe, in tel 'graphing 1
1 Telegram Xo. 57, dated :27th November
1914.
limited our operations to Kurna.
ids sanction for this move, expressly'
stated that he was not disposed to
authorise an advance to Baghdad as had
been suggested in certain quarters, and
The main considerations which governed