'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎297r] (600/1386)

1. The defensive both on the Quetta side and in the Khaibar is cur
J pei 10 e. ^ ion I say tlie “defensive “ I mean, of course coupled with
) In w ei ? S1VC * V.V 11Jght ’ for instance, from Landi Kotal strike at
/ lv 1 ; l n an ' / 1 W01 PP greatly impede Afghan co-operation with
, “iV i Z 11 18 t llu Mohmands^thongh, of course, not so effectually as at
l a a Mf ought to mention that Jellalabad is only 51 miles, or four
maic ics irom Lamli Kotal, so to persons unacquainted with the ground it
ooks quite a simple proposition to go to Jellalabad and maintain ourselves
iiieie. i>ut it is not so. As this assertion may be disputed, I must enter
nito a few details.
' J \ l'J ie ban Army is badly organised and trained, but it is numerous
o-iwu? a T ed - Pbe^deneral Staff at Simla, in 1912, put the strength at
''P ‘ * 1 eg!ilars and 500 mobile guns, including -17 mountain batteries ;
l liere would also be a horde of irregulars all well armed, who, as guerillas,
G l 1 -T, ayR )een 11103t ^ orm ‘ ( ial)le. Moreover, this enemy would not be the
ill led, ill armed, and .11 supplied labhle of 1879. It would be directed by
>eiman and lui'kish brains, and its reserves of ammunition, &c., are
described by Sir George hWKeppel as “gigantic.” Finally, as our
attack would be confined to the Khaibar line the enemy would be able to
concentrate in force against ns, so that there is no analogy between the case
ot 18/9 and the present one.
0. Then again I am not sure that one Division is sufficient to bold the
! eshawar valley and the Malakand area, exposed as they would be to
attacks similar to those of 1897, by Bunenvals, Swatis, Bajauris, Mohmands,
niui Alndis. All the past eight or nine months we have had the equivalent
nt two or three Brigades mobilized in the Swat valley, on the Bimer
border, and on the Mohmand frontier about Shabkadr. All these columns
miglit have again to be put in the held, besides one on the Bara side to
watch the A iridis^so it is quite out of the question to suppose that what
are termed the “internal security” troops would suffice. The a^reo-ate
force allotted for internal security to the Malakand and the Peshawa? vallev
is hopelessly inadequate : —
Two Batteries (10 guns).
4| Battalions.
No Cavalry!
7. When I examine the situation on the Kohat-Kurram frontier I find a
force detaded to hold that important bastion against Afridis, Orakzais
Khostwals, and Afghans, consisting only of—
One Regiment of Cavalry.
One Mountain Battery.
One Battalion Indian Infantry.
How could^ we hope to. maintain the railway from Thall to Kashalgurh
and the all important bridge over the Indus at that point with so small a
force ?
8. lor Quetta, instead of a complete Division we have only—•
Two Brigades of Infantry.
Four Batteries of Artillery.
( hie Battalion of Pioneers.
One Regiment of Imperial Service Cavalry.
I his force would I believe be sufficient for a delensive role, but it could
do nothing more. 9
9. Finally, we have no reserve at Pindi to draw upon, and nothing
behind except internal security ’ troops and two Emergency Brigades
composed of -Territorials and Nepalese at Ambala and Jubbulpore respectively,
which brigades are primarily intended for internal defence. The following