'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎259v] (524/1386)

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' on the °thor hand it should he thought that any important modifications in above
factors have taken place or are likely to do so we consider Nixon will be able to capture and
hold Baghdad with four divisions and that it will not be necessary to draw an additional
division from the main theatre unless it were freely available owing to the general strategic
plfwt of operations. °
‘‘ To regard capture of Baghdad as impossible would be to give up our best means of
countering the German intrigues in Persia and Von der Goltz's plans for organising Persia
;<nd ■Afghanistan against India and should therefore be dismissed from our calculations. Our
success hitherto in Mesopotamia has been main factor which has kept Persia Afghanistan
and. India itself quiet, and to give up the idea of Baghdad would be to relinquish initiative’
and, would result in a further transference eastward of the theatre of war. p 0 r these reasons
we approve Nixon’s attitude in not discussing the alternative of adopting a defensive attitude
as a. permanency though he must necessarily remain chiefly on the defensive until bis
reinforcements can reach the front.”
On the 1st December the Turks caught up Townshend and made a serious
attack on his retiring column. The troops behaved magnificently and the
attack was repulsed.
■ On the 3rd December General Townshend’s sorely tried but indomitable
Division had reached Kut-el-Amara, the point at which it had been decided
to ^tem the Turkish advance and to await reinforcements, which it mav be
mentioned began to arrive at Basra on the 2nd December.
’On the 5th Townshend reported :—
All sick, wounded and prisoners have been evacuated from Kut. Cavalry Brigade is
being serif back to Ah Ghaibi to join hands with General Younghusband’s Brigade.”
W ith the rest of his force, four Brigades and 34 guns, General Townshend
settled down to prepare for an investment, and to await relief. The offensive
idle so brilliantly begun by the 6th Division had come to an end. The
bi ight anticipations formed on insufficient information and on a too eager ;
and optimistic disregard of all difficulties or discouraging factors bad been
abruptly shattered. We were to pay the penalty of a too easy confidence in
the fighting superiority of our gallant troops.
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