'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎258v] (522/1386)

oS
Having placed tlicse alternatives before you. I leave the question with confidence for TT'f*
Majesty's Government to decide, but 1 trust that the decision will he in favour of tho first,
alternative.
“ From Secretary of Slate to Viceroy, dated 21st October 1915.. : -
“ Private. Your private telegram of 21st Octolxtr. Baghdad advance.
“ Report of Combined Staffs estimates that Nixon has only some 9.000. Turkish troops and
some irregulars to deal with for next two months; that Turkish forces maybe somewhat
increased by end of year, and they might conceivably reach a total of 00,000 by end of
January and even larger figures during 1916. They consider that if reinforced by two Indian
divisions from France fie might with assistance of river flotilla face risk of attack by 60,000,
but there would remain possibility of enemy receiving further reinforcements at later date.
“ Staffs hold, therefore, that it would be unwise from purely military point of view to occhpx
Baghdad unless military authorities have power to withdraw troops at once without regard t,6
political considerations if military exigencies make this necessary. . r
The \\ ar Office would give the two Indian divisions, but could not under any circum- •
stances spare further reinforcements, and are doubtful of their capacity even to supply drafts
if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think Baghdad can be taken easily ami
held for some time, but as explained above it might become untenable later. ,
“ At present moment it seems that German attempt to breakthrough to Constantinople
will succeed, and pur position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. Persia seems
drifting into war on German side whilst Arabs are wavering, and unless we can offer them
great inducement will probably join Turks. We are, therefore, in great need of striking-
success iu the East both to check Persian movement and to win Arabs.
. “It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we
favour creation of Arab State independent of Turks, and that we shall be prepared to consider
future disposition of Baghdad in connection therewith. Is this practicable? Sherd f c‘-f
Mecca will certainly ask for declaration of our intentions as regards Baghdad if we occupy it.
Unless you consider that possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance’ •
all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.”
On the 23rd October anotht r War Council was held, the result of winch
was the definite order contained in the following telegram •—
O O
“ From (he Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 23rd October 1915.
“ -No. 3099. Nixon may march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that force he lias available is
sufficient for the operation. Reinforcements will take time owing to relief and transport
arrangements, hut two divisions will be sent as soon as possible. I will telegraph probable
date later.”
The telegram was followed up the same day by official letters to the War
Office and the Admiralty pressing for the immediate despatch of the
sanctioned reinforcements, which were to bring the total force up to four
Divisions and one Chivalry Brigade.
The decision thus arrived at was clearly in accordance with the views of
the Commander-iu-Chief in India, for on the 25th October in a telegram to
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he observed :— • '
“ From Chief of the General Staff. India, to War Office, dated 25th October 1915.
(No. S. 25298.)
A e have to be prepared to meet the Turks in superior numbers ; and this be in o' the case
Baghdad, the best position at which to meet them, should be immediately occupied, an<V
a reinforcement of two divisions should reach the Tigris within two ' months. Baghdad in
Turkish hands becomes the base for Turkish operations by both the Tigris and Euphrates,
lines, and for the coercion of Persia ; whilst politically the failure to seize what appears to be
within our grasp would be interpreted throughout Asia, Persia, Afghanistan, and the East as
weakness.”
from the 1st to 11th November the War Office sent half-a-dozen
telegrams reporting various Turkish movements from Syria, Armenia, and
Mosul towards Baghdad, To this India replied on the 13th November in a
telegram to the \\ ar Office that their information re 20,000 Turks at Dar-el-
Aor was discredited, and that the only reinforcements reported to have
reached Baghdad via the Euphrates ••oute were 8 Q.F. guns and 1,000 men.
On the rotli, I Oth, 17th, 18th further intelligence was cabled to General
Nixon regarding Turkish movements. ■
On the 18 th, General Nixon reported that the enemy tv ere advancing off
/oeur Irom Ctesiphon, but that General Townshend would attack hint 5 on
the morrow.
On the 10th, it was reported that “ Zeur was occupied with slight
opposition. The enemy retired towards Ctesiphon.”
Gu the 2Ufh, General Nixon wired to the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, War Office : —
t bave received from my own agents similar news regarding a lar«v force under You
der.Goltz over a fortnight ago, but at present I do not accept their reports as conclusive for
VtAiious icasons. I Iouno stutc tlic solltcc of vour iiifoi'nicVtion , . .