'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎256r] (517/1386)

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r»f Baghdad i»y Britisli troops would impress the Oriental mind not only in r i urkey, hut als(>
w Persia and India, and re-establish some of the prestige which we have lost by our failure
n force the Dardanelles.
“ If, however, we are unable to hold Baghdad when 60,000 fresh troops assemble to
< o operate with Turkish troops at present in Mesopotamia, our withdrawal from Baghdad might
h >.vc as great and as unfortunate an effect on the Mohammedan world as our withdrawal from
the Gallipoli Peninsula.”
From the above it will be seen that at this date the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the
War Office were practically in agreement as to the risk involved.
Mr. Chamberlain also telegraphed privately on the subject observing that
it, seemed “ imperative to stop Nixon’s further advance.”
On the 5th October the advance guard of General Townshend’s Division
had reached Aziziyah, nearly hall-way to Baghdad, and on that date the
(Secretary of State telegraphed as follows :—
u From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 5th October 1915.
“ Private. My private telegram of 4th instant. Nixon’s advance. Cabinet, to whom
p.isition was reported yesterday, decided to appoint Committee of General Staff, Admiralty,
i'oreign and India Offices to consider in all its aspects possibility and policy of advance on
Baghdad. Political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable as isolating Germans
ti Persia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place. Barrow thinks v\e
might be able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened by further losses would be
in sufficient both to hold it securely again counter attack and to maintain conununiiations.
Kitchener can,hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt- Let me know yom
views.”
The above telegram was crossed by one from General Nixon which
depicts the frame of mind produced on him by his recent notable victory
‘ From General Nixon, Khit-el-Amara. dated <>th October 191o.
“ (Addressed to Chief of the General Staff: repeated to the Secretary of State for India,
with reference to his telegram of 4th October.)
“ 308/203/9. Navigation difficulties have been overcome by lightening ships and utilising
(bom for towing laden barges and by marching troops with land transport, i he 16th Brigade
with all field artillery left this morning for Aziziyah by road, preceded by headquarters
Cavalry Brigade with three guns, “ S ” Battery, and 100 lances. Cavalry has orders to reach
Aziziyah evening of the 7th. Enemy appears to be no longer retreating, bat has occupied
<'tesiphon position and thereby constitutes a threat to ns. Our information is that Ids troops,
edne&ially those locally recruited, have been much demoralised by defeat at Kut-el-Amani. a
position which thev considered impregnable. They are now so near Baghdau that Nur-ed-dm
c. ill have difficulty*in making a determined stand with men who are close to their iiopies and
wish to desert. ' I consider, therefore, that there is every probability of catching and
smashing the enemy at Ctesiphon as soon as the 6th Division has fully concentrated at
AzHsiVah” and has been reinforced by drafts of cavalry now on their way from Basrah. If on
C other hand we retire from Aziziyah to Kut-el-Amara, the enemy and the whole of the
tribes will place their own construction on a such a move, and advance on Kut-el-Amara, ns
b did on Amara in July last, when troops were withdrawn Irom post above Amara in order
to reinforce General Gorringe on Nasiriyah line. 1 him a powerful section of the tribes \\ h »
h id already submitted to us rejoined the Turks, ami has been a contitrial source of trouble
until British prestige was re-est ihlished by the victory at Kut-el-Amara. The Arab tribes now
regard us as irresistible, and have been coming in from all directions to make submission ; but
if vve withdraw will probably behave as before.
“ It is my view that we" have in front of us a shaken enemy who has lost 13 guns and is
deficient of ammunition, and for military reasons it is clearly desirable to smash him while we
chi. He has taken refuge in a position where we can manceuvre and L hope destroy him. i
see nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity. From a military point of view
Baghdad is a focus of Turkish lines of advance and a large supply centre, of which in on •
interests it is vital to deprive the enemy, and this quite apart from any political effect its
occupation might have.
On the Gill October in bis IT. 8215, the Viceroy quoted General Nixon s
views as follows :—
“ YV r ith reference to my suggestion to open by another general action road to Baghdad, will
von kindly let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another
Division from France, in order that my position there may be maintained. Lfleet of my
occupying Baghdad would be more than nullitied if subsequent events should
course of time, to retreat down the river in consequence of
forthcoming.”
compel me. ri
reinforcements noi bein<
The Viceroy concurred in the above views in the following words :—
a * * *
“In view of German activities in Persia, increasing pressure on A fgliauisi ,i n. and tb '
aspect in the Balkans and Dardanelles, we hold that the capture of Baghd id wmiM ha e uch
an effect in the Near East, and offers such important political and strategi ail a< v mini os as to
justify movement, but to do this at least an additional 1 )ivision would he re ptired. Ot herwwe
wo do not propose to allow him to go beyond Kut-cl-nmra.