'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎253r] (511/1386)

“ Telegram'from Viceroy, dated 2nd June 1915,
o “' H - 5264. With reference to your 18f 7 dated 23th May, and General Nixon’s 129/63/1 G.
of 26th May. Goneral Nixon was instructed on the 27th May tliat his first object is to expel
fiixks from the Lower ligris below Amarah, thereby securing tlie safety of Basra and Qurnaii
from attack fj’om the Tiorth, and at the same time guarding the oil supply, as directed in your
1859 of 24th May. He reports that this operation will begin on 31st May. Its progress,
.should give him data which will enable him to give us better t{|e information you now
request. We feel, however, that while military operations are actually in progress, and ii^
present quite uncertain military situation in Lower Mesopotamia it would be undesirable and
oven dangerous to tie him down with precise orders which might not tit in with the local
situation which confronts him He may possibly find himself opposed by superior military
forces on the ligris which may impose on him a defensive attitude, or he may fird himself
strong enough to dominate situation. But neither he nor we can yet sav. We therefore
think it desirable for the present not to alter our original instructions to him, which were
scut to you by post on Hh April, except in so far as they have been modified by your
subsequently received directions, and in particular those which directed safeguarding of Pipe
Line, your 1859 of 24th May. Under the original instructions he will, as soon as he is in a
position to do so, submit a plan for the occupation of the Basra Vilayet, which includes
Aina rah. This Ire will do with a far more complete knowledge of the local situation than is
now available, and we will then report to you for further orders. We should not propose to
authorise any advance beyond Amarah, for which his force is not adequate.”
It will be observed from the above telegrams tliat Lord Crewe gave his
consent to the advance to Amara with some reluctance. His view was that
we were chiefly concerned with the maintenance of a secure base at Basra
and the safety of our important interests in the oilfields. The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
had been constantly reminded of those interests by the Admiralty while it
was not without its own anxieties. It knew that in the circumstances of the
moment in Europe no military assistance could reasonably he expected from
the War Orhce. It recognised that India could send no farther reinforce
ments, and though it was fully aware of the strategic and other advantages
of holding the Tigris Valley up to Amara it was doubtful as to our capacity
to do so. if the Turks mustered in force to attack us there. It was felt,
however, that it was difficult to reject the considered opinion of those on the
spot who were obviously in a better position to judge of the loc al conditions
and the relative strength and value of the opposing forces than we were.
The “ amphibious ” operations that ensued were carried out under
General Townshend between the 31st May and the 4th June by two Brigades
of the 6th Division. The enemy were driven from their positions and
pursued with unrelenting vigour in spite of sweltering heat and difficulties
of navigation. On the 3rd June Amara was reached and its garrison of 700
Turks surrendered to General Tpwnshend and 22 British sailors and soldiers.
This audacious exploit was promptly rewarded the next day by the opportune
arrival of the Norfolk Regiment and the immediate collapse of all opposition,
Turkish or Arab. As a bold and well-planned military operation this
brilliant episode of the war deserves high praise, while the immediate
political results were all that we could wish for or were ever anticipated by
the military and political authorities either in Mesopotamia or India.
With the occupation of Amara and the submission of all the tribes in
the Karan valley, the gallant Mesopotamian Field Force might, without
reproach, have rested on its laurels till the end of the blazing and
enervating summer, but General Nixon with the full support of die Govern
ment of India, deemed it inexpedient to remain inactive whilst any Turks
were within striking distance, he therefore next directed his activities
towards the Euphrates side. There had been naval reconnaissances up the
Euphrates channels both from Basra and Kurna, which indicated an
eventual offensive movement in that direction, but the first positive
intimation on the subject received at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was the following—
“ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated IStli June 1916.
“ Nixon wires that he proposes that two Brigades should now move on Nasiriyeh jn
order to secure Euphrates portion of Basra \ ilayet. We concur in this operation whii li
should have a good effect on the Euphrates tribes and propose to instruct him to proceed us
soon as his preparations are complete. His present force should be quite sufficient for the
success of operation and the maintenance of new position.”
»
This view of the situation was accepted by Mr. Chamberlain as though
the broken Turkish force at Nasiriyeh could scarcely be regarded as a menac;
M.S. 152. B