'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎248v] (502/1386)

As regards the British battalion for this brigade could yon not spare one of the best of the
Territorial battalions r 1 This would still leave 41 British battalions in India, and Nicholson
Committee estimated absolute requirements at 39, namely, 9 battalions for frontier divisions
and 30 for internal defence.
“ 1 am of course aware that we are very deficient in Indian Infantry, but this may not be
.altogether a disadvantage under present circumstances. You might also be able to give a
Territorial battery for garrison duty at Basra even if not fit for field operations. I wish you
could spare another Cavalry regiment, as I understand the country at this season is well
adapted to that arm.”
As we had failed to get troops from the War Office this telegram was
iollowed up on the 2(>th by an appeal to the Admiralty for certain Marines
who were believed to be available : —
“ better from the Under Secretary of State Tor India, Military Department,
.to the Secretary, Admiralty, dated 26th February 191i, No. 1672.
Sir, .
As you. are aware, the Secretary of State for India has. been desirous for some time
past of increasing the British Force in Mesopotamia, as in his opinion the military situation
there is not altogether free from anxiety. The Turkish forces in that region are constantlv
increasing, and everything points to the advantage of striking an early blow at their advanced
positions before the menace becomes more serious.
“ India appears to be quite unable under present circumstances to contribute more British
troops, and the War Office have repeatedly expressed their inability to provide them. I am
therefore to enquire whether, considering the very important naval interests involved at
Abadan and in the Gulf generally, the Lords of the Admiralty are disposed to send one or
more battalions of Marines for incorporation in the Expeditionary Force under Lieutenant-
General Sir A. Barrett.
. *• Lord Crewe .is well aware .that the demands of .the Fleet are the dirst consideration, but
as the idea of sending 2.000 marines to German East Africa has now been abandoned, he
thinks it possible that the above force might be spared for the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .”
The Admiralty in their reply M. OK) 13 of the 1st March, regretted their
inability to spare Marines. iffie following telegram was thereupon
despatched :—
“ Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
3rd March 1915.
‘•16*2. Reference your H. 3321 and C.G.S. telegram 4141 S. to C.I.G.S. Have now
•ascertained definitely that neither War Office nor Admiralty can give any assistance in troops
or marines, so that whatever force is required to meet eventualities either in Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. or
at Aden must be found from India.
“ It seems to us here that considering the present relative proportions of British and
Indian troops in India and now that three'regiments are en routr for India it might be possible
•to scrape up another brigade and concentrate it in readiness for despatch if occasion arises
You might consider whether a couple of Territorial battalions could not be detailed for this
brigade in lieu of one Regular battalion from the frontier divisions. I hesitate to press von
on this point, but I am absolutely convinced that we must take no risk in the Gulf region,
especially on the eve of what we hope may he momentous and suceessfod developments in the
near Last, the moral effect of which must not be marred by any untoward incident in the
Txulf.”
On the same date the Viceroy sent a long tefegram explaining his views.
The telegram is an important one as it clearly shows the light in which our
•difficulties presented themselves to the Government of India, it is therefore
■ quoted verbatim : —
“ Telegram from Viceroy, dated 3rd March 1915.
11. 3o 17. Wmr telegram of the 23rd ultimo, No. 1664. We agree that the position of
Force 4 D gives cause for great anxiety and that we maybe faced shortly with a serious
attack on Basra.
“ ft is difficult to obtain reliable information as to distribution of Turkish iprees, -but,we
hear of at least three divisions (other than the 35th) which cannot be precisely located and
are reported to be destined for Mesopotamia. If this be so the enemy might attack Basra via
the Euphrates with forces considerably superior to ours and with a large number of Arab
auxiliaries and ibis might happen within the next month or six weeks. The rise of the Tigris
above Kurna seems likely to prevent active .operations by either .side on That river and
apparently the Turks are t ransferring troops to the Euphrates. It would be a difficult task to
smash their advanced troops since their German advisers are not likely to allowthe Turks to
make the mistake of coming within striking distance of Basra until they have concentrated
t heir forces. They could then advance on a wide front subject to suitable arrangements for
:SU PPK T i n £ their right wing, which would be in the desert, which could probably be made.
Barrett has at present 14,400 men raid 40 guns including his detachment at Ahwaz and would
stand little chance at Basra if widely outflanked.
As iegaids oui resources we are as you say to receive three battalions from China tliouHi
ihe date of arrival of 36th Sikhs seems very doubtful. Even so we shall be better off by two
battalions only since we have had to send the 18th Infantry to China to replace one of them.
Assuming that we send Barrett another Brigade as you suggest this would give him 17,400
-men only. Our position in India, is deteriorating internally and trophic on the Frontier ip’the
spring is probable enough and must be provided fur.