'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎247v] (500/1386)

14
£i Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department dated
29th .January 1915.
“ 1^07. Reference my 1603, your H. 3053, H. 3064, and Cox's telegi'&ttt of* 28th and
• Barrett's of 29th. 6 * H
‘• I presume 12th Brigade Vfill not arrive Muhammera^i till about 7^1 F^Vparv. Con
sidering reported movements of enemy and spread of Jehad this may be too late to’ protect
pipe line and oil-fields, as without visible support friendly Arabs and Bakhtiaris may lose
confidence in our power to assist them in defending same. ■■■J-
“ Under these circumstances is it not possible to send some troops from Basra forthwith
by river to Ahwa? ? Lynch’s steamers and other available transport can probably convey a
few mountain guns and a couple of battalions which should suffice to hearten Sheikh and Ips The branch of the British Government of India with responsibility for managing political relations between British-ruled India and its surrounding states, and by extension the Gulf, during the period 1937-47.
adherents as the Turkish raid is probably more formidable as regards potential numbers than
as regards its military vahje, while Ahwaz affords a good defensible poiqt d'avpui.
“1 am asking Admiralty to send “Odin” back to Shatt without delay and am also
pressing War Ofiice for further reinforcements of second line troops from this* side which
would replace 12th Brigade in India and enable you to bring Barrett’s force up to equivalent
of two Divisions. It may be advisable to secure Bakhtiari loyalty by the promise of next
half years oil dividend in advance.
“ Please acquaint me fully with your views on above suggestions and of action you propose
to take thereon. I assume that Barrett has now' five ba,ttalions and two batteries at Basra
besides Cavalry and Sappers ; so if Barrett sends force at once to Ahwaz as proposed above
he may think it necessary to strengthen Basra garrison by troops from Kurna pending the
arrival of 12th Brigade. I understaml you can send no more troops from India except
Cavalry as already suggested and probably some Sappers.”
“ Telegram from Viceroy, dated 30^ January 1915.
“ H. 3501. Your number 1607. 12th Brigade should arrive at Mohammerah about
7th February. It is possible that they may be too late to protect pipe-line and oil-fields but.
in our opinion, their protection should not be regarded as our principal object, which is to
crush any attacks on Kurna or Basra. Defeat at either of these places necessarily involves
subsequent destruction of oil-fields and pipe-line. In our view' Barrett should not detach
troops to Ahwaz unless he feels confident that he can safely spare them, and w'e doubt whether
this is his opinion. In any case the whole decision must be left to him as he alone is in a
position to judge. We shall be glad to receive any reinforcements that can be sent us, but
would prefer that this should if possible take form of the return of a Division of our
own troops from Egypt. Second line troops from Home can hardly be regarded as suited to
frontier defence. Without reinforcements can send no more troops to Mesopotamia except
three squadrons, of 16th Cavalry now under orders and perhaps a Territorial battery.
“ We are repeating your telegram and this reply to Barrett and are asking for his views
Question of securing Bakhtiari loyalty by promise of next half-year’s dividends in advance
will be replied to separately.”
The situation had grown so serious in Mesopotamia, and the resources in
India were so strained that Lord Crewe felt it incumbent on him to press for
reinforcements from home, and consequently under his orders the following-
letter was addressed to the War Office.
“ No. 1610.
“ Tp Secretary, War Office, dated 20th January 1915.
Sir,
“ I am directed by the Secretary of State to call attention to the serious military
situation in India involved by the urgent necessity of sending reinforcements to the Persian
Gulf.
“ As yon are aware a threatened attcck on the Karun oilfields and pipe-line together with
the increasing menace to our position on the Shatt-el-Arab owing to the co-operation of the
Arabs with the Turkish troops has compelled the Government of India to despatch a Brigade
from Karachi to meet the emergency.
1 he Secretary of State is convinced that this reinforcement should be speedily followed
by others if we are to maintain our position and that General Barrett’s Force in the Persian
Gulf should be raised without delay to the strength of two Divisions. He is further of
opinion that we ought to have a Brigade in readiness in India to reinforce Aden at short
notice ; but I am to point out that India is totally unable to provide these reinforcements,
unless British troops can be despatched to India forthwith to ensure her internal security
and adequate forces for the defence of her frontier. J
“ I therefore to ask whether the Secretary of State for War can arrange for the very
early despatch of at least eight battalions to India. Highly trained troops are not necessary
for this purpose and Lord Crewe will be well satisfied if battalions of the New Armies or
Territorials, can be detailed for this duty. These troops will be able to complete their
training in India and will then eventually be fitted to release other fully trained units.
The attached table will show the. inadequacy of the present garrison of India ”
* * » * *
On. 3181 January the Viceroy arrived at Koweit. Thence he proceeded
to the^hatt-el-Arab, visiting Abadan oi^ the 2nd, and on the following day
made a trip by launch up the river Karun. On 4th February^Lord //
Hardinge, after receiving the Sheikh of M^hammera /f atrd investing him'wftlTT^
the K.C.S.I.. proceeded to Basra, which he made his headquarters until the
7th. In the course of his reply to an address presented by the British