'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎239r] (483/1386)

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“ Telegram from General Xixon, Xo. 1008 155/0, elated 12th December 1915.
“ Paragraph 9.—General summary. The situation is a grave one. Until I know how
-soon sufficient troops can be ? report. Want of adequate river
transport is more acute than ever. The net result of my demands in this direction since July
last is one ship from India promised at the end of this month It is hoped that a furthef
supply will be forthcoming from the middle of January onwards.
“ As a general question of communications the attitude of Persia cannot be overlooked.
As long as present benevolent neutrality maintained there is no cause for anxiety. Attitude
of Pusht-i-kuh is doubtful. Any concentrated hostile action on part of latter would be a
menace to my communications on Tigris and Karun, but signs are at present inoperative. It
is useless to disguise the fact that the troops of the 6th Division are warworn after a year of
continuous campaigning, and the result of their recent heavy losses in officers and men has
had inevitable result, rendering it desirable to employ them when relieved on communications
rather than at the front. General Townshend may be depended on to do everything that »s
humanly possible to inspire those around him with his own wonderful spirits.”
Telegram from Viceroy, dated 14th December 1915.
1008/149/0 of 11th and 1008/155/0 of
“ H. 9767. With reference to Xixon's Xo.
12th December, we offer following lemarks:—
“ We agree that Townshend cannot now leave Kut. We Consider however that Sheikh
Said is too far forward for concentration of relieving troops, and are suggesting to Nixon that
this is the case. As regards departure of troops from Egypt, Xixon has been informed at
once of all sailings of which we have luurd. You have been kept fully posted as to progress
in obtaining river craft in India and their transfer to Mesopotamia. It lias been very difficult
to obtain suitable craft for river w ork there, and still more difficult to find among them vessels
capable of making voyage from India to Basra.”
^Telegram from General Xixon, dated 14th December 1915.
“ (Addressed to Chief of General Stall, repeated to Secretary of State.)
“1008/168/0. 14th. Continuation of my 1008/149/0 and 1008/155/0 of 11th and 12th
December and LG. 7.40 of 14th December. In view of facts that there are now four Divisions,
35th, 38th, 45th. 51st, in front of Townshend. That 5th Composite Division is now arriving
Baghdad. That. 36th Division is reported following it and due Baghdad second week in
January. That 17th Division may he following. And that 26th Division is reported
concentrating on Euphrates line, making total of eight Divisions as possible concentration
against me within next two or three months, 1 must ask for another two Divisions to be sent
tome as soon as possible, otherwise 1 may have to tight again without any reserve.”
/'I’ rom Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
5th December 1915.
“ (Addressed to Viceroy, repeated to General Officer Commanding, Basra.)
“ 3204. War Committee met to-day. Orders given to hasten despatch of remaining
Division from France. Transport difficulties are enormous and make it quite impossible
to send now two additional Divisions as asked by Xixon. I doubt if they can be spared
later, but’this will be further considered.”
>' / Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
15th December 1915.
“ (Addressed Viceroy, repeated Xixon.)
“3206. In continuation of my telegram 3204. I now learn from Admiralty that the
greater part of the two promised Divisions will reach Basra by 31st December. Some details
and horse ships will be a few days later. The delay is entirely due to French arrangements
for Convoy.
“There are great difficulties in immediately finding either the two additional Divisions or
the transport for carrying them in view of pressing necessities elsewhere but the matter will
be considered.”
Vi ’elegraln from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
20th December 1915.
“ 3226. Xixon’s telegrams, 1008/155/0 of 12th December and 131/54/0 of 19th December,
leave us in some uncertainty a.s to his plans and as to bis reasons for bis present dispositions.
According to such information as we possess we should suppose that his first object should b)
relief of Townshend, and all available troops should be concentrated for that purpose. After
relief of Townshend, protection of our position on Karun side seems to usnnost urgent
matter. But we recognise that his local information may make a different course advisable.
Can you throw any light on his plans and reasons for them r ''
r^Tel
7(
“ Reference to
replied as follows:
‘ Paragraph
Telegram from Viceroy, dated 25th December 1915.
your Xo. 3226, 20th December, which we repeated to Nixon.
Nixon has
11th December, as regards Nasiriyah.
conditions is probably not realised
1.—Please see concluding portion of paragraph 3 of my 1008/149/0,
The difficulty of reinforcing Nasiriyah under existing
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conditions is prooaoiy not realised. ^ . _ ( /