'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎237v] (480/1386)

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In tins connection it is important to note that on the 12th October
General Nixon cabled as. follows :—
“No. 129/209/1. ... In answer to query, Egypt wires 7th: ‘Continual movement
‘ of enemy troops from Syi'ia and Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. to Constantinople and no signs of anything
‘ important going to Mesopotamia.’ Reliable information received here indicates no garrison
of any importance in Baghdad (on) 5th October.”
On the date on which this telegram was sent, General Townshend with
the bulk of his division was half way to Ctesiphon, so might have been
expected to get reliable information. On the 14th October the War Office
submitted a paper drawn up by the General Staff on “ The Question of
occupying Baghdad.” The following extracts from that Report are useful
to record
“ The position at present is that Sir J. Nixon, after a succession of victories over enemy
forces, has pushed a considerable force to Azizieh (within 5d miles of the city). He has
been ordered not to advance to it at present, and it is under consideration that no such
advance shall take place unless a force of one complete division and a cavalry regiment be
ensured to him as a reinforcement to reach the Shatt-el-Arab within one month of his
undertaking the final advance. The first question to consider is, therefore, that of the time
which it will take to convey a division of the Indian establishment from the theatre of war in
France to Basrah.”
* # # *
“ The suggestion with regard to the period of one month has been discussed by an Inter-
Departmental Conference which has been sitting at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . It is understood that
this .period lias been proposed after a review of the Turkish position in the theatre of
operations at the present time. But as Baghdad is now clearly threatened it is possible that
the Turks will hurry reinforcements to the spot, and that, within the next few weeks, the
situation will have changed. Ft therefore seems very desirable that a decision should be
arrived at as soon as possible, because otherwise the division, which it is proposed to send,
may not prove sufficient for the purpose.
“To meet the possibility of the Turk^ assembling greater forces at Baghdad than is at
present anticipated, and to ensure that sutH’cient force will he available to overcome the
maximum resistance which it is estimated that the enemy can offer at Baghdad, the General
Staff is of opinion that two Indian division's shpuld bei.added to Sir J. Nixon s army if he is
to take and,occupy Baghdad.”
# * # #
“ Unless India is prepared to supply f he additional division which is required to justify the
advance-of Sir J,, Nixon on to Baghdad, the General Staff are of opinion that such an advance
should not he sanctioned until one or more divisions from France can leave Egypt for
Mesopotamia. With the forces now at the disposal of .the General Officer Commanding, a rtove
to Baghdad would in their opinion be a dangerous operation.”
The Inter-Departmental Committee above referred to was assembled under,,
the direction of the Prime Minister to consider certain definite questions
regarding the strategic situation in Mesopotamia. The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the War
Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office were represented on this
Gomuoittee. The questions put by the Prime Minister and the conclusions
thereon were as follows :—•
QUESTIONS.
1. ; Whether there should be an advance on Baghdad.
2. The defensive positions at Baghdad as regards a possible advance of Turkish troops.
3. Whether without Baghdad as a point of departure any offensive operations on a large
scale could bp made by the Turks in the neighbourhood.
4. Generally the effect which the occupation of Baghdad by us would have on the Turkish
forces engaged against Russia and against ourselves in the Dardanelles.
* * # #
“ CONCLUSIONS.
“ 1. The Committee consider that, both on military and political grounds, an early advance
upon and occupation of Baghdad is most desirable ; hu,t that, unless the Expeditionary Force
now in Mesopotamia can be so reinforced that it, can maintain its position after reaching
Baghdad, no attempt should be made either to seize or occupy that city.
“ The immediate reinforcements necessary for tl}® retention of Baghdad are at least tho
equivalent of one infantay division of the Indian Arrrjy and one or two regiments of cavalry.
It is essential, if an advance on Baghdad be decided on, that reinforcements of this strength
should at once be definitely assigned to Mesopotamia, and that fhey should without fail begin
do arrive at Basra within four weeks of the issue of the orders for the advance.
“ The Committee are of opinion that these reinforcements cannot be furnished from the
garrison in India.
“ If reinforcements on the scale mentioned above cannot be provided, and if, cotwitlx-
aijauding- the Indian Government .are satis tied that General Nixon can defeat the enemy forces
cimmediately fronting him, and that on military and other grounds an action is desirable, they
M.S. 174. B