'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎29r] (57/1386)

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I elegram from Viceroy, dated 2nd June 11)15.
H. 02(14. V itli reference to your 18f.7 dated 28tli May, and (leneral Nixon's 129 03 1 (!.
of 2()tli May. (xeneral Nixon was instructed on the 27th May that his first object is to expel
I urks from the Lower i igris below Amarah, thereby securing the safety of Basra and Qurnah
from attack from the north, and at the same time guarding the oil supply, as directed in your
1859 of 24th May. He reports that this operation will begin on 31st May. Its progress,
should give^ him data which will enable him to give us better the information you now
request. \Ve feel, however, that while military operations are actually in progress, and in
present quite uncertain military situation in Lower Mesopotamia it would be undesirable and
even dangerous to tie him down with precise orders which might not fit in with the local
situation which confronts him He may possibly find himself opposed by superior military
forces on the 1 igris which may impose on him a defensive attitude, or he may fird himself
strong enough to dominate situation. But neither he nor we can yet say. We therefore
think it desirable for the present not to alter our original instructions to him, which were
sent to you by post on 7th April, except in so far as they have been modified by your
subsequently received directions, and in particular those which directed safeguarding of Pipe
Line, your 1859 of 24th May. Under the original instructions he will, as soon as he is in a
position to do so, submit a plan for the occupation of the Basra Vilayet, which includes
Amarah. I his he will do with a far more complete knowledge of the local situation than is
now available, and we will then report to you for further orders. We should not propose to
authorise any advance beyond Amarah, for which his force is not adequate.”
It will be observed from the above telegrams that Lord Crewe gave his
consent to the advance to Amara with some reluctance. His view was that
we were chiefly concerned with the maintenance of a secure base at Ilasra
and the safety of our important interests in the oilfields. The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
had been constantly reminded of those interests by the Admiralty while it
was not without its own anxieties. It knew that in the circumstances of the
moment in Europe no military assistance could reasonably be expected from
the \\ ar Office. It recognised that India could send no further reinforce
ments, and though it was fully aware of the strategic and other advantages
of holding the Tigris \ alley up to Amara it was doubtful as to our capacity
to do so. if the Turks mustered in force to attack us there. It was felt,
however, that it was difficult to reject the considered opinion of those on the
spot who were obviously in a better position to judge of the local conditions
and the relative strength and value of the opposing forces than we were.
The ‘ ‘ amphibious ” operations that ensued were carried out under
General Townshend between the 31st May and the 4th June by two Brigades
of the 6th Division. The enemy were driven from their positions and
pursued with unrelenting vigour in spite of sweltering heat and difficulties
of navigation. On the 3rd June Amara was reached and its garrison of 700
Turks surrendered to General Townshend and 22 British sailors and soldiers.
This audacious exploit was promptly rewarded the next day by the opportune
arrival of the Norfolk Regiment and the immediate collapse of all opposition,
'Turkish or Arab. As a bold and well-planned military operation this
brilliant episode of the war deserves high praise, while the immediate
political results were all that we could wish for or were ever anticipated bv
the military and political authorities either in Mesopotamia or India.
With the occupation of Amara and the submission of all the tribes in
the Karim valley, the gallant Mesopotamian Field Force might, without
reproach, have rested on its laurels till the end of the blazing and
enervating summer, but General Nixon with the full support of the Govern
ment of India, deemed it inexpedient to remain inactive whilst any Turks
were within striking distance, he therefore next directed his activities
towards the Euphrates side. There had been naval reconnaissances up the
Euphrates channels both from Basra and Kurna, which indicated an
eventual offensive movement in that direction, but the lirst positive
intimation on the subject received at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was the following—
“ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th June 1916.
“Nixon wires that he proposes that two Brigades should now move on Nasiriyeh in
order to secure Euphrates portion of Basra Vilayet. AN e concur in this operation which
should have a good effect on the Euphrates tribes and propose to instruct him to proceed as
soon as his preparations are complete. His present force should be quite sufficient for the
success of operation and the maintenance of new position.”
This view of the situation was accepted by Mr. Chamberlain as though
the broken Turkish force at Nasiriyeh could scarcely be regarded as a menace
a
M.S. 152.