'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎20v] (40/1386)

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On the 3rd January the Government of India telegraphed to
Sir 1\ Cox :—
'• Reference your telegram No. 68 B., dated 27th November 101 t. The followinir telegram,
dated the 1st. instant, has been received from the Secretary of State for India:—‘ Foremn
‘ Office Circular regarding Fgypt does not apply to Basra, whose inhabitants continue, from
‘legal point of view, pending formal change of status by annexation or otherwise, to be
‘ Ottoman subjects, and cannot be considered as British protected persons. Such persons
‘ may, however, be treated by Sir P. Cox. with special consideration, and he mav give them
■ all possible assistance unofficially.'
It was also decided not to treat as enemy cargoes consignments of Ilasra
merchants on the high seas, a concession which lias since been extended to
the cargoes of A mara merchants.
J he administration ever since has been guided by the general sanction
thus conveyed in the above telegrams.
As regards (B) the following telegram dated 23th November was received
from the Viceroy.
Private. I have received the following private telegram from Cox at Basra:
" ‘ Private. Dated 23rd November.
“ ‘ General Officer Commanding and I are studying the topographical details bearing on
the question of advance to Bagdad in case that course be decided on.
Will Your Excellency kindly consider the problem. It would be convenient if we could
learn the intentions of Government in this connection as soon as possible in order that
thorough proposals may be submitted without delav.
The local outlook is as follows. According to general reports Turkish troops recentIv
engaged with us were completely panic-stricken and very unlikely to oppose us again. Arab
element in Bagdad is already friendly, and notables here volunteer opinion that we should be
received in Bagdad with the same cordiality as we have been here, and that the Turkish
troops would offer little if any opposition.
“ ‘ There remains the tribes between here and Bagdad. From among this element the
well-known Muntafik Sheikh Ajaimi, who was ostensibly co-operating with the Turkish troops,
has just sent in an emissary to convey his submission (?) and intimate Ids wish to come in
and hand over d.OOO rifles received or seized by him from the Turks, and it is hoped that
the neutrality if not the active co-operation of the tribes can be seemed by judicious
diplomacy.
“‘Effect of the recent defeat has been very great, and if advance is made before it
wears off and while cool season lasts Bagdad will in all probabilitv fall into our hands verv
easily.
After earnest consideration of the arguments for and against I find it difficult to see
how we can well avoid taking over Bagdad. We can hardly allow Jamshedi (?) to retain
possession and make difficulties ferns at Basra : m r can we billow any other Power to take
it ; but once in occupation we must remain, for we could not possible allow the Turks to
return after accepting from Arabs co-operation afforded on the understanding that the
I urkish rryime had disappeared for good.
- ‘ It is perhaps a groups omitted . Moreover can we disregard consideration that there
are some thirty British subjects detained there whom we need release.
“• I may mention that 1 sent Captain Shakespear to Bin Sand with instructions to get
him to come north and to remain with him in case we wanted him to assist us with the tribes
beyond Basra. I shall report officially in due course arrangements we are makiim for
administration of Basra.’ Ends. •
“Before giving you my views I am consulting the Commandcr-in-Chief and will
formulate them as soon as 1 know how far- the proposal is feasible from a militarv point
of view'.” J 1
With reference to the above the Military Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , submitted
on the 27th November the following- Minute on the situation.
i eksian tjrr.r upekatioxs.
“Now that the first phase in these operations lias been successfullv concluded it is
advisable to decide what should be the next step, as a poliev of passivebnactivitv is to be
deprecated if we arc to continue to impress the Arab and Indian w orld with our‘abilitv to
defeat all designs against us.
“ The 17th Brigade is due to arrive at the Shalt within tl.e next week or so and hv the
time it arrives General Barrett and Colonel Cox will have been able to form a sound appre
mat,on of the position with regard to the Arabs. If this is favourable then it will be quite
safe to move forward, though I think it would be at present premature to embark on anv such
ambitious project as the occupation of Baghdad. A suitable objective presents itself in
kurna. which is about oO miles above Basra at the junction of the Euphrates and Tmris (
to this point the navigation at this season is practicable for ships of war like the Odh and
for many of the transports winch have brought the troops from India, as ships «,f 15 feel
draft can ascend up to this point. 1
“ So far as we know the.* is no obstacle to an advance by then, to Knrna n„d it is most
unlikely thnllhen; won any oppos.l so Unit it will 1 „. safo „„ ,,
with a brigade of infantry and a proportion of the other arms.