File 301/1921 'MESOPOTAMIA: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS' [‎277r] (566/586)

\aticaii lias been given no opportunity of exercising* the powers of an / nvpe-
num in Imperio to which it lays claim.
b). _ Hie great majority of the Mujtahids and £ Ulama of the holy towns
are Jrersian subjects. Iheir pol tical outlook is coloured by events in Persia
which have no direct bearing- on Mesopotamia, and in any difference of
opinion with the local authorities they are accustomed to seek support by an
appeal to Persian opinion. Thus their political influence cuts across estab
lished authority in the ‘Iraq and as the Turks were fully aware, constitutes
a danger to the State. It may safely be predicted that the Arab Government
uni find it no less obstructive. That clerical intervention should lie avoided
m dealing* with the tribal revolt is from the national point of view a step in
the right direction.
•20. Appeals for Persian intervention have not been lacking*. In Sep
tember an emissary from Xajaf, Shaikh Muhammad Biza Erivani. carried
letters sealed by the Shaikh al Shari‘ah to the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh and Kur
dish tribal chiefs, calling* upon them to rise in aid of their co-religionists.
He arrived at Kermanshah on September 22nd, at a moment when dissensions
between the two leading chiefs of the.Kalhur, the Amir i Mu‘azzam and the
Amir ‘Azzam, had produced a somewhat critical situation. The Wali of
Pusht-i-Kuh was encamped, with an unusually large force, within six miles
of Harunabad, and relying on his support, the Amir i MiPazzam was exer
cising the authority of Governor of Kalhur, though be was not recognised as
such by the Persian Governor of Kermanshah. The tribal unrest and the
presence of the Wali were a menace to British lines of communication.
Shaikh Muhammad Biza was known to be the bearer of letters from the
Shaikh al Shari‘ah to Hamadan, Kasvin and to the Persian Cabinet at
Tehran, accusing the British Government of stifling independence in the
‘Iraq and of destroying sacred edifices at Kufah and elsewhere, coupled with
an appeal for help. The leading priests of Kermanshah delayed his progress,
but declared that their position was one of great difficulty, as they feared
that they might be accused of apathy in religious matters. Finally on
October 5th they telegraphed a discreet message to the Shaikh al SharFah
expressing* the hope that the appointment of Sir Percy Cox as High Commis
sioner would profoundly modify the situation in Mesopotamia. Meantime
the tension at Kermanshah had relaxed. The two Kalhur chiefs came in to
the Governor on September 24th, and were sent by him to Tehran on
October 5th, to seek a settlement of their differences. The Wali had no fur-
Iher excuse for remaining in the neighbourhood and withdrew to Dahbala,
while the Kalhur tribe settled down, with every mark of satisfaction at being
relieved of its leaders. At the end of October, Shaikh Muhammad Biza was
still - a + Kermanshah, but his presence had become comparatively harmless.
21. Another effort was made by the Shaikh al SharFah early in Novem
ber to obtain the assistance of the Persian Government. He despatched a
messenger to Kermanshah with a telegram addressed to the Shah in which
he begged for the intervention of the latter on bfehalf of Haji Mirza Ahmad
Akhund and Saiyid Abul Qasim Kashani, ‘TTlama of Karbala, whose sur
render had been demanded under the terms imposed on the town. Both had
been active in encouraging* disturbances.
22. The members of the provisional government which had been set
up by the insurgents at Karbala, were summoned to Baghdad, but none of
the ‘TTlama were called upon to accompany them. A deputation consisting
mostly of ‘TTlama, headed by Saiyid ‘Abdul Husain Tabatabai, was sent to
Tuwairij, but they returned to Karbala before the order permitting them to
proceed to Baghdad was received. When the terms given to the town were
made known, letters were addressed to the High Commissioner from Saiyid
‘Abdul Husain, his uncle Saiyid Hasan Tabatabai and Haji Mirza ‘Ali
Shahrstani, proving that an indigent and innocent Persian population might
be exempted from the demand for rifles or their equivalent in money. Mirza
‘AH lias a reputation as a divine second only to that of the Shaikh al SharFah.
He had maintained an attitude of complete neutrality and the Tabatabai
Saiyids also had participated little in the movement. To their letters, as
well as to those received from the Persian Consul at Baghdad and Persian
tradesmen at Karbala, the High Commissioner replied that no general exemp
tion was required as 1 the terms applied only to those who had taken an active
part in the rising.
23. The town having failed to pay up its quota. of rifles or money
within the allotted time, troops advanced from Tuwairij on Karbala: where
upon Mirza ‘Ali and Saiyid ‘Abdul Husain came to Kadhimain in person to
intercede with the High Commissioner. But before the interview took place
the P 0 of Hillah had regularised the division of the fine between townsmen
and tribesmen and the toll of rifles or their equivalent in cash had been col
lected almost in full. It was therefore considered unnecessary to prolong
the stay of the troops in the vicinity, and the High Commissioner was able
to assure the two divines that any inconvenience caused by the presence of the
troops had now been terminated.