File 301/1921 'MESOPOTAMIA: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS' [‎111r] (232/586)

which 0 fell T at e the 8 e 1 nd 1 o£?h 1 ai J i;i le - ti H f ° r ‘* e ”? 011th ending May 15 states that the heavy rains
already been cnt and aKd “
some cases the grain germinated on the ground. But Northern Mesopotamia benefited
flood irrig^
ingly difficult. DlreCt ° rate ’ the oontro1 of the su PP'y of water in the canaN has become increas-
Grazing is everywhere plentiful owing to the late rains.
Department 68 ° f COtt ° n haV ® been sow " in the distri e ts with »eed supplied by the Agricultural
KURDISTAN.
40. The High Commissioner’s communique (see No. 13, para. 27) has been nresenterl to
the provincial Majlises of the Mosul Wilayet. ’ P j 6 presented to
The Majlis of Dohuk expressed the opinion that the people of Dohuk, ‘Aqrah, ‘Amadiyah
and Zakho were inseparably connected with Baghdad and Mosul by industrial, economic and
Commercial ties. Ihey accepted the proposal for a Sub-Liwah, with British Officers as Mnta-
sarrif and Qaimmaqams until suitable natives could be found. They maintained that arrange-
inents separate from those of Mosul should be made for the election from this area of deputies
to the National Assembly, but urged that the Kurds should be free to select candidates from
any part of the country. They submitted that local magnates should not be appointed Qaim
maqams in their own districts. They undertook to canvass the people to induce them to join
the Levies, but if their efforts did not meet with success they held that Government should take,
such measurees as might be necessary to provide the forces needed—a phrase which covered a
strong feeling in the Majlis in favour of conscription. They expressed appreciation of the
manner in which they had been consulted as to their treatment under the future Administra
tion.
41. I he Zakho Majlis welcomed the idea of a Sub-Liwah as likely to safeguard them from
undue interference from Baghdad while maintaining intact their economic ties with Mosul.
They approved of the appointment of a British Mutasarrif but rejected Ifhe suggestion that
Kurdish speaking Arabs might be suitable as officials. Kurds only, whether Moslem or
Christian, would be acceptable. They wished the Sub-Liwah to form a separate electoral entity
but thought it would be necessary for the present to chose Mosulis to represent it, owing to the
lack of suitable local candidates.
42. The ‘Aqrah Majlis was adverse from forming part of the Sub-Liwah and would have
preferred to remain attached to Mosul under British A.P.O.s. They expressed a deep distrust
of Arab or Kurdish Qaimmaqams and objected to the formation of Kurdish and Assyrian Levies
which would, they considered, be a source of trouble in the future. The retention of the British
army was preferable to them. They concluded by saying that though these were their wishes,
if the British Government decided to act otherwise they would be obedient to its orders.
43. The reply from ‘Amadiyah has not yet come in but little doubt is felt that it will be
in general agreement with the scheme.
44. Arbil has also accepted it and Rawanduz has sent in a madhbatah to the same effect.
45. As regards Sulaimani, six of the most influential citizens were invited in April to meet
the Political Officer for an informal exchange of views on the future of the Division and its
relations with the ‘Iraq Government. Two were unable to come on account of sickness. The
four present showed that they fully realised the importance of preventing any interruption in
the commercial relations of Sulaimani with Baghdad and ‘Iraq, and. of assuring to the Division
the continuance of departmental assistance and control, but they were somewhat anxious lest
union with the ‘Iraq should imply the discontinuance of British control and the placing of
Kurds in the hands of Arab officials. They volunteered the opinion that an indigenous Kurd
ish administration, unless it were under the direction of British officials, could not organise or
govern the Country. They thought that in addition to the representation of Kurdish interests
by sending delegates to he National Assembly and by the privilege of direct correspondence
with the High Commissioner through the Political Officer, it would be necessary to constitute
a Divisional Council on the lines of the Turkish Majlis ‘Idarah. If adequate safeguards were
provided they considered that union with reservations, Semi-Independence as they called it,
was the best form of Government for the Division.
46. A second discussion on the future position of Sulaimani took place on May 8, four
notables being present. A distinct disinclination to union with the ‘Iraq was then manifested,
the alternative preferred being a welding together of Kurdish districts under a British mandate.
The notables argued, that though for the present Kurdish interests would be protected by the
High Commissioner and British officers, a future Baghdad Government would inevitably be
biassed in favour of an Arab as against a Kurdish policy. They recognized the fact that
Sulaimani would be adversely affected if a customs barrier were sent up by the ‘ Iraq, and that
they might lose a profitable source of income in the tobacco excise which has hitherto been
collected in Sulaimani instead of from the Mesopotamian consumers, but they preferred on the
whole to risk these drawbacks rather than to live in fear of ultimate encroachment and oppres
sion from an Arab regime.
47. Finally a plebiscite was taken on the High Commissioner’s communique.
(a) For Sulaimani town residents in houses valued at Rs. 1,000 and over were entitled
to a vote. They numbered 200 of whom 190 voted. Only 32 were in favour of
inclusion in the ‘Iraq. Among the poorer population the Mukhtar of each
Mahallah summoned the male residents together and their vote was taken by a
show of hands. Two Government clerks were present at the count. Except in the
Jewish quarter where 92 persons voted in favour of inclusion and 4 against in-
i _ elusion, not a vote was given in favour.