File 537/1921 Part 2 'Persia: Oil - A.P.O. Co's development of new oil-fields; Oil Boring at Dasht-i-Qil; A.P.O. Co's agreement with Kashkuli Khans' [‎198r] (67/254)

JlhiS-Dociimcnt isJheJProperty of His Britannic Maiestvs Government.
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 8445/6/34]
FNa. _l.r
Sir P. Loraine to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 24.)
(No. 432.y
- , , , XT Tehran, July 6, 1922.
T , , N m 7. d + e , s P atch No, 427 of the 3rd July I had the honour to acquaint your
Lordship with the negotiations which took place in the neighbourhood of Shiraz between
the resident manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the
Qashqai cine tain, in regard to the agreement concluded last year between the company
and the ivashkuli khans foi the exploitation of oil deposits in the regions of Dashti-gil
and Bikarz, and I alluded therein to the question of Soulet-ed-Dowleh’s personal
position as practical head of the tribe. r
In this latter connection I beg leave to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying
copies of despatches from His Majesty’s consular officers at Shiraz and Bushire* and I
must begin by saying that I myself concur in the views expressed by Colonel Trevor.
Strictly speaking, Soulet-ed-Dowleh is not the ilkhani The paramount chief of certain tribes in south west Iran. of the tribe, his son,
Mohammed Nasir, being the titular holder of that position ; the son is, however, a mere
instrument in the hands of his crafty and unscrupulous parent, who actually wields the
power and enjoys the prestige of the ilkhaniship.
the record of Soulet-ed-Dowleh before, during and since the war are so well known
to your Lordship that no recapitulation of it is necessary here. It will suffice to say
that this chieftain became engaged in active hostilities against British and British-
organised forces, that he gave our military authorities some anxious moments owing to
his success in investing Sir Percy Sykes’s force in Shiraz, but was eventually and
effectively chastised for his temerity. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has neither forgotten nor for
given the defeat inflicted on him ; he is a party who requires periodical chastisement, but
unfortunately there is no one now in a position to administer it; while his respect for
anyone is in direct ratio to his belief in their capacity to inflict it. I mention this
because it is important to bear in mind that in dealing with people like Soulet-ed-
Dowleh, force is the deciding factor. It is not unfair to postulate that there are three
ways of dealing with Persians : force, money and kindness. Of the three, the two first
alone make an impression on Soulet-ed-Dowleh.
Shortly before Sir Arnold Wilson’s arrival in Pars, Mr. Chick represented to me
that the circumstances were favourable for the deposition of Soulet-ed^Dowleh from his
position of paramount authority over the tribe; there were numerous local complaints
against his harshness, and against the brutal and lawless depredations of his tribesmen ;
his influence in the province was wholly deleterious, his attitude towards the^ Prince
Governor-General amounted to overt insubordination, his relations with his life-long
rival, Qawam-ul-Mulk, were worse than ever, and it was only restraining British
influence which hindered Qawam-ul-Mulk, whose was an element of order, from seeking
to overthrow the Qashqai chieftain. Mr. Chick indeed had at one moment reported to
me confidentially that Qawam-ul-Mulk was so desirous in the general interests of the
province of Pars that Soulet-ed-Dowleh should disappear for a time that he was willing
himself to go a for a long trip abroad if the Qashqai leader were billing to act
similarly. # # • i* a i l u
The idea of killing two birds with one stone, that is of getting rid of Sou e -e -
Dowleh and his mischievous influence, and also of enabling Sir A. Wilson to treat wit
a far more tractable negotiator than this chieftain, was not lacking in attractiveness.
Moreover, Mr. Chick had expressed to me confidently the opinion that a mere act ot
deposition coming from the Central Government would of itself proba y e su cien
to effect Soulet-ed-Dowleh’s downfall, as most of his adherents would at once desert him
and the numerous people who had suffered under his tyrannous and avaricious sway
would forthwith raise up their heads and complete his discomtituie 5 t at, in any case,
the merest handlul of Government troops would suffice as a nucleus around w ic o
rally the malcontents, while Qawam-ul-Mulk and his Khamseh tribesmen would be
ready to clinch the matter should Soulet-ed-Dowleh seriously show fight, furthermore,
[87 aa—6]
* Not printed.