'Report on Sistan and the Country Between It and Mashad' [‎50r] (104/118)

l\o. 7. Tabas to Birjand, 17 miles to Furg-i-Darmiyan, over a plain
and up a gaadual ascent, dhence via Isfizar pass to Birjand^ 47 miles, pass
ing* the villages of Darmiyan at the 2 nd, Doshingan the 7 th, Isfizar the 21 st,
Bojd the 40th mile. The pass is 7,000 feet high. I failed to cross it on
the 1st March 1898 owing to the snow. The villagers say it is always closed
for several months during the winter: total 60 miles.
No. 8. Husemabad to Saribeshay* 29 miles, over an upland plateau, with
# Bellew thick vegetation, past a spring of water, and then over the
Godar-i-Ghunda Koh (6,900'), not practicable for
artillery in its present state.
The chief centres of supplies along these roads would be Turbat-i-Haidari,
Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam, Gunabad, Taiabad, Bui, Kain, Isfidin, Tabas (Suni-
khana), Birjand, Dnruh, and Neh.
The best time for military operations is the spring. About the middle
Time for military 0 ^ Fe ^ ruai T the grass begins to sprout, and round the
operations. villages are crops of lucern, etc. At other times of the
jear, i.e. y from July to February, being entirely depend
ent for fodder on the supplies of chopped straw, it would be most difficult to feed
even a veyy modeiate foice of cavalry, not to mention the numerous bag’gage
animals, other than camels, that v. ould probably accompany an army in the
field. Theie is generally some rain in the spring that would tend to make
the roads worse than they usually are, as a great deal of the soil is of a light
clay, but the question of forage outweighs that. In the winter the snow
blocks many of the passes. Firewood is very scarce at all times.
I have described the country and its roads, commencing from the north,
strategical considera- the event of any operations in connection
tions. Wlth ^istan, it is extremely unlikely that we would
march northwards against a Bussian force through Persia.
Probably the utmost that we would attempt in that direction would be to
impede Bussia s advance, and file best position for doing so, ir we went beyond
the confines of Sistan, would appear to be along the line of the Kaleh Kuh,
commanding the Isfizar pass and the plain of Isfidin from the village of
Ahmgeran to Afih ; thence south-west guarding the passes to the north of
Birjand. Here the zone of inhabited country through which an army would
advance from Mashad to Sistan is narrowest.
Sistan is undeniably a place, of great strategic importance. If we were
already established there, we might on the outbreak of hostilities be able
to jsend a force to the relief of Herat. Sistan is only 270 miles, while Chaman
mil Kandahar is 487 miles distant from Herat.
The communications of a force marching from Sistan on Herat would
be in a great measure protected on the left hank by the stretch of waste
country, some. 70 miles across, that intervenes between Persia and Afghan
istan from Sistan to Hashtadan ; and Sistan itself could be held against
an enem^ a small force. But if we neglect Sistan, our example is
not lively to be followed by the Bussians. They have shown such activity
of late in this direction as to lead one to believe that they would endeavour to
occupy it in case of war. They would then find themselves on the flank of
the Kandahar army, and a very small contingent of Bussians* there would
tend to distract the attention of the Kandahar force from the task of defend
ing the more northern part of Afghanistan, and would in any case be of
immense advantage to Bussia both strategically and morally.