File 2006/1917 'ARABIA: ARAB CONFEDERACY' [‎295r] (599/603)

[P 2700]
From Resident, Aden, 9th July 1910. f'>c'
(Repeated to Foreign, Simla; High Commissioner, Cairo ; Bombay Political)
. 226 A - P - . 8th Ju }y- Referring to your telegram of 7th July. Following
is my appreciation ot local political situation which I submit in full as 1 am
handing over to General Stewart on Tuesday.
Idrisi is a remarkable personality and all available evidence indicates
him to be reliable. Though he would resent intrusion of Sherif into ksir
he assured Turton that if Sherif forestalled him at Kunhda or Abha before
he could arrange to attack them he would avoid conflict with him, dependino-
on our treaty of promise to adjudicate after expulsion of Turks. ’ Turton is
absolutely convinced of his loyalty, and had no intention of conveying
impression that he thought Idrisi likely to attack Sherif—on the contrary,
he is willing to help him. Under our treaty obligation we have undertaken
to provide Idrisi with munitions of war. It would be unjust to incite
him to attack Turks unless we are prepared to fulfil our obligation with
regard to guns as well as rifles. It is unnecessary to ask for guarantees
because by means of blockade we could reduce him to terms in a short
time, moreover, there is every reason to believe that he is loyal, and his past
actions and present interests and sentiments confirm this. The chief
reason he will have nothing to do with Imam is that latter broke faith with
him in 1910. Having now written friendly letter to Sherif he will himself
keep faith.
Chief —London — wires that Italian ammunition is not available but some
15-pounders and 5-inch howitzers may be forthcoming from Egypt. These
may be useful and I have instituted enquiries at Jezan but now mountain
guns and ammunition are primary requisite. Our chief endeavour should
now be to supply him with sufficient guns and ammunition to permit of
successful action against Turks. As regards Imam less is known but so
far he has given the Turks little military assistance. Although he is
personally subject to Turks his tribesmen for most part despise him and
hate the Turks and he would find difficulty in getting large numbers to
fight for him except in a popular cause. According to late Arab reports,
Turks are not assured of his loyalty to them. Idrisi distrusts and
dislikes him and no co-operation is likely, but Idrisi will not attack him
unless we give the order or in self-defence. Idrisi has left sufficient
troops on his southern border to act on defensive. Idrisi will later on
wish to attack Loheya, but at present he does not wish to stir up Imam.
The latter has not sent large bodies of troops to help the Turks against
Aden but only a few thousand. He has made a threat _ against
Hadramaut, but these have now been withdrawn. The Abdali Sultan
has written friendly letters to Imam imploring him to join the rest
of Arabs against Turks, and I have written to similar effect. 11 he
is once assured Turkish cause is bad he will perhaps turn against
them if he could raise tribes. Under the circumstances it appears to
be the wise course to let Imam remain undisturbed until he has made up his
mind But it would be well to instruct Idrisi to come to definite terms with
Hashid and Bakil who are already independent of Imam and f™ndly to
Idrisi and inform ns what financial ass.stance will be required from us. No
movement to be made except on our order. What appears essential .s that
we should know what is to be Arab status after ejectment of links. W ha
territorv is going to be adjudicated to Idrisi who has been loyal throughout
Hd to Imam who at present has troops fighting against us f It is ^ possib e
to offer inducement of territorial acquisition to mam to jq^sTs 1 reward for
because we have not made up our minds what is to be Tdrisi s reward
faithful service^ ^ expectations reach from K-fida south
ward to and "including Bodeidah, and P™L a 2rll I cT] gi™ not J
Zaraniks, some of whom have always been hls a a * e dioators Ude. our Treaty
of his expectations eastward O ur d utie yas anj . ^
are likely to leave us friends with neither party >f we it is
to grow up, but in any case Imam s Pi° s P n ff ere d to secure his offensive
difficult to suggest what inducemen s cai j oqij/ j le now receives
against Turks, unless it be an annual income equalling ne
from them. . T , . . wactprn coast, and of Kaiti
By consolidating authority of 11 v hone to preserve peace
Sultan of Mokalla, on south coast of Arabia, we may hope to piesti i
Sultan of Mokalla, on soutn coast or affnression and internal unrest,
and security of country against take over a Protectorate of South
Xf^“ir7"ffi^imah. But if we do not take
west vuiucu wax xx^ - • • , 1C . xvv not will expect to take over
some action, Imam whether he Jo" , ’ ie d by Turks and Sheikh
country including Lahej, now political!) occupiec y
Sai in short, we may keep ^
“Tirevelally to eUnoinffidep'endeace by intermediary control of
his trade routes to coast both west and south.
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