Coll 30/9 'Persian Gulf: Administration Reports 1926-1938' [‎479v] (963/1028)

was perfectly ready to burn all he had and do without them
for the future if they wished it, provided that they at the same
time would burn all their arms and ammunition, which were
equally invented and manufactured by infidels. The matter
was discussed by the religious leaders, and it was eventually
decided that both were equally lawful.
(3) The demolition of the 'Iraq Desert Posts. This demand, with
which it was obviously impossible for Ibn Sa’ud to comply,
caused the most trouble, and the best that Ibn Sa’ud could do
was to persuade the Ikhwan to keep the peace and take no
action against the Posts for a further period of two months, to
enable him to make one final attempt to obtain their demoli
tion by friendly negotiation. Ibn Sa’ud had to promise,
moreover, that if he failed in this attempt he would be with
them heart and soul in an attack on the Posts—a promise
which there is little doubt he never intended to fulfil.
►
Ibn Sa’ud on his side demanded that the Ikhwan would only trade with
such places as he directed, and to this they agreed. This was of course
largely to prevent trade with Kuwait, which for monetary reasons he is
unwilling to allow. Ibn Jiluwi had recently restricted trade with Jubail
and Qatff in order to induce the tribes to come to Hasa, but this had resulted
in their coming more to Kuwait, and by October the Mutair and other
tribes were ignoring the embargo and coming into the town quite openly.
This largely ceased after the Conference, and was further prevented by a
detachment sent for the purpose by Ibn Jiluwi.
On the conclusion of the Conference Ibn Sa’ud distributed exceptionally
lavish presents of money, arms, camels, etc., to ’Uzaiyiz and the other
Ikhwan leaders.
Ibn Sa’ud next informed the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Bahrain, through his
agent there, that he would like to meet him and invited him to come
to Hasa when he himself went there. The invitation was accepted, but
shortly afterwards, on the 5th December, Ibn Sa’ud sent word to the Poli
tical Agent, Bahrain, that he was detained in Riyhdh and could not come
to Hasa at present, so no meeting between them took place. About the
same time Ibn Sa’ud received a communication through the British Agent at
Jiddah regarding the decision of His Majesty’s Government regarding the
negotiations between himself and Sir Gilbert Clayton and agreed in prin
ciple to the proposal that the points under dispute between ’Irkq and Najd
should be referred to arbitration. It was possibly this that induced him to
change his plans, or it may have been certain disquieting symptoms of un
rest amongst his tribes which became evident.
In the beginning of December rumours reached Kuwait that Ibn Litmi,
who had been somewhat insubordinate of late and had left the Riyadh
Conference without permission, had been contemplating a raid, but that
Dawish had forbidden him to do so during the two months’ truce which had
been arranged.
Then a man arrived in Kuwait who had left Riyadh on the 9th Decem
ber, and had heard a few days later on the way that Dawfsh had sent word
to Ibn Sa’iid that he was preparing to go raiding—presumably on the
expiration of the two months.
On the 30th December information w T as received that a big raid was
being planned : Ibn Hithlain had joined Fuqm at Jaryah, Dawish was
advancing from Artawiyah almost immediately, and Ibn Kami had already
moved off.
The Shaikh of Kuwait sent out patrols, although he thought there was
little fear of any action against his tribes--except possibly by Ibn Hithlain,
in the event of his acting alone—and considered the ’Iraq Desert Posts a
much more likely objective for all.