Coll 30/9 'Persian Gulf: Administration Reports 1926-1938' [‎247r] (498/1028)

until she is forced to come to terms, which means being incorporated in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a vassal State.
(c) In the meantime from his point of view the King is killing two birds
with one stone. For apart from continuing the slow process of starving
Kuwait, he is successfully preventing the Ajman, Mutair and Awazitf tribes from
having any but secret intercourse with their mother city.
(d) Actually Bin Sand’s troubles in Asir and the movement to the Yemen
border of almost the whole fighting strength of his State, have caused a certain
amount of slackening off in the blockade to become evident. The tribes recognise
that Bin Sand’s hands are full and that his whole mind and attention is fixed on
how to settle his differences with the astute Imam Yahya. They have become
bolder in consequence and more and more of his tribesmen have been coming
up to Kuwait and getting back safely again with contraband.
(e) In spite of heroic efforts on the part of Hamud al Bagaawi (the butcher) j
Bin Sand’s blockade Officer on the frontier, there has been a definite deteriora
tion in the measures of the King to keep trade from flowing from Kuwait.
(/) A new factor and one which may have far reaching reactions (if not
seen and checked bv the King) has recently made itself apparent. In the past,
Bin Jiluwi, the Governor of Hasa, used to seize a large amount of the customs
and revenues of Hasa and divert it to his own personal use. Hence he was one of
the chief personages to benefit by the diverting of the trade of Kuwait through
Bahrain. Tp assist in this he has for years employed the House of Qusaibi to
nroTiagand for him in Bahrain, and took full advantage of the fact that the
Bali rain Government were equally anxious to see Kuwait trade come thiough
their ports. Since, however, the King send Mohamed al Tawil to act as his
Revenue and Customs Director in Hasa the latter has prevented Ibn Jilom from
<< wqino' tho fill ”, so to speak, and the latter dissatisfied and angry is, it is
<nnid doing all he can to ruin Al Tawil with his master, and has even gone as far
(so the rumour says) as to secretly order Al Bagaawi to ease off certain blockade
measures so as to get more trade back to Kuwait and cause^ the customs receip s
of Bin Sand’s ports to show a falling off. This of course is all to the good (i
true). , , , .
On the 15th June the Shaikh received a letter from Bin Sand m which ne
was asked to raise his “ Customs ” to the figures (70 per cem. to ICO per cen .
ad valorem) in force at the King’s ports of Qatif, Jnbail and Ojair, bm Sand
for his part' promising to remove all blockade restrictions m the interior.
The King ignored the fact that the very existence of Kuwait depends almost
entirely on her transit trade with the interior.
swrsrssai ■ *«*• —.
the system which the King himself proposed for Kuwait m 1930.
(h) The King never replied to this counter ofiei.
VII.— Relations with ’Iraq.
(a) These '-ve been outwardly ^cordiM and
tensioiAvistin g belween the two States, which differs little from that existing
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
This tension was further increased by the following incidents which took
place duun, tb.^ j ca ^ ^ ^ ^ gaghiyah and Faddaghiyah Estates were
“ T onfiested bv claimants who were considered by the Shaikh to have
been instigated by the ’Iraq Government.
(l) A (Vmand on the part of the ’Iraq Government that the Shaikh’s
( date hardens at Fao hitherto exempt should pay axes and export
duty including produce intended for his own household use. 1 hese
taxes and duty were actually taken from the Shaikh.
tel The ’Irao Government put obstacles in the way of, and levied fee?
(C) 1 ’'"non Kuwait water boats which bring drinking water for the Town
from the Sliatt al Arab.